Removing the Constraints for Growth: Some Guidelines Some Guidelines by César Calderón & Rodrigo Fuentes.
Documento de Trabajo
ISSN (edición impresa) 0716-7334
ISSN (edición electrónica) 0717-7593






www.economia.puc.clVersión impresa ISSN: 0716-7334 
Versión electrónica ISSN: 0717-7593 
 
 
PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA DE CHILE 
INSTITUTO DE ECONOMIA 
 
 
Oficina de Publicaciones 







REMOVING THE CONSTRAINTS FOR GROWTH: 
SOME GUIDELINES 
 
                                César Calderón 
                                J. Rodrigo Fuentes* 
 





































ABSTRACT                     
   
 
1. INTRODUCTION                    2 
 
 
2. METHODOLOGY AND DATA                4 
    2.1 Data and Sample                     5 
    2.2 Econometric Methodology                  9 
 
 
3. EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT                  13 
3.1 Baseline regression                    13 
3.2 Complementarities between trade and financial openness            15 
3.3 Constructing the index of policy environment               17 
 
 
4 REMOVING THE CONSTRAINTS TO GROWTH: ECONOMIC POLICY AND STRUCTURAL 
FACTORS                      21 
 
 
5. AGGREGATE VOLATILITY, ECONOMIC POLICY AND GROWTH        27 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS                    34 
 
 
REFERENCES                      36 
 
 
APPENDIX I                      38 
 
 
APENDIX II                      39 




J. Rodrigo Fuentes 
Central Bank of Chile 
Second draft: June 2008 
Please do not quote without permission ABSTRACT FOR CALDERON AND FUENTES  
One  strand  of  the  empirical  growth  literature  has  cast  doubt  on  the  ability  of  the  policy 
recommendations from Washington Consensus in enhancing growth. They argue that not only the 
design but also the policy mix has an important country-specific component (e.g. Hausmann, 
Rodrik and Velasco, 2005 and Zettelmeyer, 2006). We argue that the effectiveness of policies 
in  promoting  growth  depends  upon  the  set  of  structural  policies  implemented  or  already 
existing in the country. This paper empirically examines the role of policy complementarities in 
explaining growth and development from two dimensions.  First, we construct a regression-
based policy index in the same vein of Burnside and Dollar (2000), and we decompose this 
index afterwards into domestic and outward policy indices. Second, we evaluate the role of 
policy complementarities in the growth process by interacting our policy index with specific 
country characteristics that affect growth. We repeat the same exercise with the domestic and 
outward  policy  indices.  We  found  that  outward  oriented  and  domestic  policies  are  highly 
complements to each other. Specifically, the growth effects of trade and financial openness are 
enhanced when domestic policies are correct and, moreover, financial and trade openness are 
also complements. Regarding structural factors, we found that human capital increase growth 
as expected but it is neither a complement nor a substitute of economic policy. On the other 
hand institutions and financial depth are complements with economic policy. This could be an 
explanation why some countries have stabilized their economies but they are not growing 
faster, this could be due to low financial development or bad institutions. 
Finally, we should remark that in addition to the Fatas and Mihov (2006) result that policy 
volatility  hurts  growth,  we  find  that  a  good  policy  environment  could  propel  growth  by 
mitigating the negative effect of aggregate volatility and, more specifically, the volatility of 
external shocks. 1. Introduction 
The relationship between the quality of policy and growth has revived in the last few years. 
Since the Washington Consensus recommendations followed by several countries around the 
world, people is assessing whether those policies has been indeed growth promoting. There 
are many examples of economies that exhibit good growth performance introducing the 
recommended reforms. However there are other examples of economies that have 
implemented the reforms and they have not received the same return. 
A good example of the latter group of economies is Latin America As reviewing by 
Zettelmeyer (2006) there are three lines of arguments to explain why reformer economies 
have not been successful in Latin America: the reforms were not deep enough; reforms went 
too far; reforms went in the wrong direction. The hypothesis in our paper is that the effect 
of reforms in some areas heavily depends on other structural factor of the economy, i.e. 
there exist certain complementarities that are quite important to design a strategy to reform. 
Specifically we rescue the relationship between the quality of macro policy and growth. 
The empirical association between economic policy and growth found in different papers
1 
has been questioned by Easterly (2005). The main caveats are that for having a measurable 
impact on growth a large change in macroeconomic policy variables is needed, the results are 
not robust to econometric methods and the inclusion of institutions. The weak relation 
between economic policy and growth found in the empirical literature has pushed the 
discussion toward the idea of complementarities among policies. When considering this idea 
of policy complementarities nonlinearities show up in the panel or cross country analysis that 
are not consider in those surveys of the empirical literature
2. 
For instance Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2005) argue that the right policy for growth 
should be contingent to the economic environment. From the perspective of welfare analysis 
they develop a conceptual framework where removing a restriction for growth have a direct 
effect on growth, but given that we are in a second best world it is necessary to consider the 
1 Fisher (1993), Easterly and Rebelo (1993a and 1993b), Dollar (1992)
2Chang, Loayza and Kaltani (2005) and the references therein. 
2cross effects of that restriction in other markets. These other effects could be detrimental for 
growth. 
This conceptual framework seems to be an interesting way of seeing the problem that affects 
the relationship between economic policy and growth. However the implementation is ad­
hoc and there is no measure of how much growth will increase when an economy follows 
their advice
3. In this paper we attempt to measure how much removing a constraint will 
enhance growth as a function of some structural variables and other policy variables. 
We think that panel data analysis for growth has not been exhausted yet and it can provide 
important insight for understanding growth. In this paper we estimate a panel data over five­
year period from 1965 to 2000 for 76 countries. We pay special attention to econometric 
techniques that yield consistent parameters and robust estimation in a dynamic panel data. In 
a first step we use the typical cross country growth regression to construct a policy index in 
the same vein of Burnside and Dollar (2000). We define an aggregate policy index that 
includes inflation rate, government consumption, trade and financial openness. Then we 
define a domestic policy index that considers the first two variables and an outward 
orientation policy index that uses the contribution of the other two variables. This index 
shows that countries with bad policies would not experience high growth, meaning that bad 
policies will never conduct to high growth. But in the other hand, countries that have 
followed good policies present a wide variety of growth performance. 
In a second step we estimate a growth regression using this index and controlling for initial 
per capita GDP, institutions, human capital and financial openness. Here we investigate the 
nonlinearities in growth or the complementarities effects. We found that outward oriented 
and domestic policies are highly complements to each other. Specifically the effect of both 
openness to trade and financial openness are enhanced when domestic policies are correct 
and moreover financial and trade openness are also complements
4. In fact there is a 
3 They analyze the case of Brazil, El Salvador and Dominica Republic in the paper. Hausmann and Velasco 
(2006) apply the same idea for Latin America as whole. But in non of them a specific measures of the 
growth effect could be found. 
4 Chang, Katani and Loayza  (2005) analyzed  policy complementarities with trade openness, finding 
similar results. 
3threshold under which financial openness could be detrimental for growth if the economy 
exhibits a low level of trade openness. 
Later we explore the complementarities between the quality of policy and structural factors 
like human capital institutions and financial depth. We found that the human capital increase 
growth as expected but it is neither nor a substitute nor a complement with economic policy. 
On the other hand institutions and financial depth are complements with economic policy. 
This could be an explanation why some countries have stabilized their economies but they 
are not growing faster, this could be due to low financial development or bad institutions. 
For different regions in the world we take the difference in the average growth rate between 
1996-2000 and 1981-1985 periods. We decompose this difference in growth rate in 
convergence effect, the effects of structural variables (human capital, institutions and 
financial development) and the effect of policy complementarities. The latter effect is by far 
the largest East Asian Pacific countries. In Latin America (AMER), Middle East and 
Northern Africa (MENA) and Industrial Countries the contribution of policy 
complementarities and structural factors are about the same. For the rest of African 
countries (Sub Saharan and Southern) the difference in growth rate is explained mainly by 
structural factor. In conclusion fast growing economies tend to have good policies that 
complement the efforts made with the structural factors. 
The structure of the paper as follows. In next section we discuss the data and the 
methodology used in the paper. In section 3 we introduce the estimated policy index. Section 
4 we analyze the complementarities between domestic policy and structural factors to 
provide some guidelines for removing constraint to growth. In section 5 we revise the 
relationship between policy and volatility. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Methodology and Data 
This section aims to describe the data used in evaluating the role of policy complementarities 
in the process of economic growth. Our dependent variable is the annual average growth 
rate in real GDP per capita. The main goal of this paper is three-fold: First, we test the 
4complementarities between trade and financial openness —that is, we want to contrast 
whether financial openness enhances the growth effects of trade openness and vice versa. 
Second, we examine whether the effects of structural factors (such as human capital, 
financial development, institutional quality) on growth depend on the policy environment of 
the country. Finally, we evaluate whether good policy environments help mitigate the growth 
effects of rising volatility —arising from erratic policies or from external shocks.  
2.1. Data and Sample 
We have collected a panel dataset of 136 countries organized in 5-year non-overlapping 
observations over the period 1970-2005, and each country having at most 7 observations. 
Table A.1 presents the list of countries in the sample. In this sub-section we describe the 
construction and the sources of the data used in our empirical analysis. The focus of our 
paper is on the effect on economic growth of structural factors conditional on the policy 
environment. For that reason, we classify the determinants of economic growth into the 
following groups: (i) transitional convergence, (ii) structural factors, and (iii) policy 
environment. 
Transitional convergence. We include the (log) level of the real GDP per capita at the 
beginning of the period to test for the existence of transitional convergence. According to 
the neoclassical model, evidence in favor of traditional convergence implies that the 
coefficient estimate for the initial output per capita is negative and significant. This would 
imply that poorer countries may grow faster than richer countries.  
Structural Factors. In this group we consider structural factors that may foster long-run 
growth. Following Loayza, Fajnzylber and Calderon (2005) this group is conformed by 
proxies of human capital, financial development and governance. 
The role of human capital —and, specifically, education— in the economic development 
process is highlighted by ample theoretical and empirical literature. Human capital 
contributes as a direct input in the production process and it complements other factors of 
production such as physical capital and natural resources (De Gregorio and Bravo-Ortega, 
2002).  The level of human capital also enhances the ability of nations to create or adapt new 
5technologies (Borensztein et al. 1988). Policies directed to raise the level of education and 
human capital are approximated by the initial gross rate of secondary schooling (in logs) and 
the data is obtained from Barro and Lee (2001).
5 
Financial development promotes long-run growth through the identification of profitable 
projects and the ability of domestic financial markets to mobilize savings to these projects. 
Financial markets reduce investment inefficiencies by solving principal-agent problems 
through corporate monitoring and by allowing risk diversification through hedging 
opportunities (Levine, 1997). Our proxy for the level of financial development in the 
economy is the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to GDP and it is collected from 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001) and updated using data from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics and the World Bank’s WDI. 
Governance, on the other hand, comprises various areas of the institutional quality of 
government such as absence of corruption, rule of law, enforcement of contracts, quality of 
the bureaucracy, democratic accountability, among others. North (1990) argues that weak 
institutions may hamper growth by reducing the efficiency of investment. Specifically, firms 
would tend to be small scale, use low-capital technologies and have short-term horizons in 
business environments with weak enforcement of property rights. Also, institutions may 
affect growth through falling investment due to rising transactions costs attributed to red 
tape and rent seeking. In this paper, our proxy of governance is the ICRG index of political 
risk published in the International Risk Country Guide (ICRG) by the Political Risk Services 
(PRS) Group. 
Policy Environment. We consider economic policies undertaken by the government to 
guarantee price stability and low government burden, and policies to promote integration to 
international markets of goods and assets. In addition, we group price stability and 
government burden into domestic policy environment, and trade and financial openness into 
outward policy environment. 
5 This “flow” measure captures more closely current policies on schooling and human capital investment 
than “stock” measures related with educational attainment of the adult population or life expectancy 
(Loayza et al. 2005). 
6Lack of price stability is approximated by the average rate of CPI inflation. This variable 
reflects the quality of monetary and fiscal policies and is positively correlated with other 
indicators of poor macroeconomic management such as fiscal and current account 
imbalances. 
Government burden refers to the drain imposed by the government on private activity through 
the imposition of high taxes, the maintenance of ineffective public programs and an enlarged 
and inefficient bureaucracy, and State intervention in the economy. We use the ratio of 
government consumption to GDP as a measure of government burden.
6 
Trade openness affects growth through various channels. In fact, trade openness allows 
production specialization through the exploitation of comparative advantage. It also serves 
as a tool for technological diffusion and expands the potential markets for the country’s 
goods, among other things.  Trade openness is measured as the ratio of real exports and 
imports to real GDP (all these magnitudes are expressed in local currency at constant prices) 
and the data is collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Financial openness may facilitate risk-sharing and enhance production specialization, capital 
allocation, and economic growth (Obstfeld, 1994; Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997). Our outcome 
measure of financial openness involves data on foreign assets and liabilities from Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2006). Specifically, we use summary measures of financial openness 
(Lane, 2000; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001; Obstfeld and Taylor, 2002), 
FOit 
FAit  + FLit  and FOLit  =
FLit =
GDP it  GDP it 
where FA and FL refer to the stocks of foreign assets and liabilities —expressed as a ratio to 
GDP. Note that FA and FL include stocks of assets and liabilities in foreign direct 
investment, portfolio equity, financial derivatives and debt (bank and trade-related lending).
7 
6 The rational for this choice is that much of current (or consumption) expenditures by government do 
not have a clear social return and, in fact, are mostly devoted to cover the bureaucracy’s wage bill (Loayza 
et. al. 2005). 
7 In this paper we also evaluate the role of the structure of external capital in driving the long-term growth 
performance of countries. Hence, we will break down our outcome measure of financial openness into 
7On the other hand, given that international trade in debt instruments may be driven by 
special factors, we also consider an equity-based measure (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2003): 
EFOit  =
FDIAit  + FDILit  + PEQA  + PEQL 
and EFOLit  =
FDILit  + PEQL it it  it 
GDP it  GDP it 
where FDIA and FDIL are stocks of foreign direct investment assets and liabilities, while 
PEQA and PEQL are the stocks of portfolio equity assets and liabilities, respectively. In 
short,  EFO and EFOL are indicators of the level of equity (FDI and portfolio) cross­
holdings. 
Volatility. In this group we consider the effect of aggregate volatility on growth. In addition, 
we test whether growth effects of aggregate volatility are driven by either policy volatility or 
the volatility of external shocks. Theoretically, the relationship between growth and volatility 
can be positive or negative depending on the mechanisms driving the relationship (Imbs, 
2007). It has been argued that, in the presence of irreversibilities in investment, rising 
volatility can lead to lower investment (Bernanke, 1983; Pindyck, 1991) and, hence, to lower 
growth (Aizenman and Marion, 1993). Ramey and Ramey (1991) also find a negative link 
between growth and volatility if firms have to commit to their technologies in advance. On 
the other hand, rising volatility would lead higher savings and, hence, higher investment and 
growth if there is a precautionary motive for savings (Mirman, 1971). Black (1987) also 
argues that countries chose between high-variance, high-expected-returns technologies and 
low-variance, low-expected return technologies so that counties with high average growth 
would also exhibit high volatility. Empirically, aggregate volatility is measured by the standard 
deviation of growth in real GDP per capita. 
Policy volatility is measured by the volatility of fiscal policy, Vol(G), following the methodology i
outlined in Fatas and Mihov (2006). Using annual data on general government consumption, 
we isolate movements in our fiscal indicator that can be attributed to exogenous policy 
decisions and are not related to the state of the economy. To isolate these exogenous policy 
changes, we regress for each country the (log of) real government consumption spending (G) 
equity- and loan-related foreign liabilities. While the former includes the foreign liability position in 
foreign direct investment and portfolio equity, the latter includes only the debt liability position. The same 
calculation is performed for the ratio of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP. 
8 on output growth (∆lnY), the initial level of real government spending, linear and squared 
inflation (π and π
2) and a deterministic time trend (t), 
2 ln(G , ) = µ +ηt + βi 0  ,  ∆ln Y t  i  + ρi 1 ,  ln G  t  i  −1 + π φ t  i  + π φ t  i  +ε t  i  t  i  i  ,  ,  1 , 2 ,  , 
In addition, to prevent reverse causality from government spending to growth we instrument 
output growth with lagged values of output growth and current and lagged values of oil 
prices. We consider the standard deviation of the residual of this regression, Vol(εi,t) as the 
estimate of the volatility of discretionary fiscal policy. Note that data on government 
expenditure was obtained from the World Bank's World Development indicators, while 
inflation and the world price of oil was taken from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics. 
8 
External volatility captures the volatility of trade- and finance-related exogenous shocks. In 
this paper we consider: (a) terms of trade volatility, measured as the standard deviation of 
annual terms of trade changes, (b) external demand volatility as the standard deviation of the 
GDP growth rate of main trading partners (weighted by their bilateral trade with the 
domestic country), and (c) world real interest rate volatility captured by the standard 
deviation of the real interest rate of the base country following the classification in Di 
Giovanni and Shambaugh (2008).
 9 
2.2. Econometric Methodology 
In order to estimate our panel data regression model, we use an estimation method that is 
suited for our purposes. It deals with dynamic regression specifications, controls for 
unobserved time- and country-specific effects, and takes account for likely endogeneity of 
some explanatory variables. Assessing the impact on growth of the policy environment, 
structural factors and their complementarities in our panel dataset poses some econometric 
issues that can be illustrated in the context of the following dynamic equation:  
8 Note that all standard deviation measures were taken for annual changes during 5-year periods.  
9 Note that the base country is defined in Di Giovanni and Shambaugh (2008) as the country to 
which a country pegs or the country to which it would peg if it were pegged. For non-pegs, the base 
is determined by previous pegging history, cultural and historical ties, dominant regional economies, 
as well as a close reading of each currency's history. 
9y  − y  =αy  +φ' Sit +γ' P it +π' Sit ⋅P it ++µ +η +ε it  it −1  it −1  t  i it 
=αy  + β' X  it +µ +η +ε
(1) 
it −1  t  i it 
Here y denotes the (log of) real GDP per capita, S represents structural factors and institutions 
driving growth, and P is set of the policy environment variables. The terms µ  and t 
ηi respectively denote an unobserved common factor affecting all countries, and a country 
effect capturing unobserved country characteristics. The second equality follows from 
defining Xit = (S’it, P’it (Sit Pit)’ and β = (  φ ,  ' γ ,  ' π')' . 
The econometric technique deals with unobserved time effects through the inclusion of 
period-specific intercepts. Accounting for unobserved country effects is not simple due to 
the model is dynamic and contains endogenous explanatory variables. Here, unobserved 
country effects are accounted for by differencing and instrumentation. Also, the method 
relies on instrumentation to control for joint endogeneity.  Specifically, it allows relaxing the 
assumption of strong exogeneity of the explanatory variables by allowing them to be 
correlated with current and previous realizations of the error term �. 
Estimating our regression equations faces the problem of likely endogeneity among the 
explanatory variables. In fact, this problem may affect our structural factors and policy 
environment variables (S and P matrices) since it can be argued that these are jointly 
determined with the rest of the economy’s endogenous variables —that is, the may be 
subject to reverse causation from income. Also, our regression equation includes the lagged 
level of real output per capita, yit, which is also endogenous due to the presence of country­
specific effects. Since there are no obvious exogenous variables that can be used as 
instruments in our regression analysis, we rely primarily on internal instruments as suggested by 
Arellano and Bond (1991), and these are provided by suitable lags of the explanatory 
variables. Nevertheless, we should note that the presence of unobserved country 
[ characteristics likely means that  X  E  isηi ] ≠ 0 , and hence lagged levels of the explanatory 
variables are not valid instruments for (1). Therefore, we first eliminate the country-specific 
effect by expressing (1) in first differences, 
10y  − y  = (1+α)(y  − y  )+ β'(X it  − X it −1 )+ (ε −ε ) (2) it  it −1  it −1  it −2  it  it −1 
If we assume that the error term εit is serially uncorrelated and that the explanatory variables 
in X are weakly exogenous —that is, they are uncorrelated with future realizations of ε —  it 
then the lagged values of the explanatory variables provide valid instruments.
10 These 
assumptions imply the following moment conditions: 
[ ⋅(ε , Ey it  −s  i  t − εi  t  −1 )] = 0  f o r  s  ≥ 2;t = 3,...,  T  (3) , , 
[ i  t − εi  t  −1 )] = 0  f o r  s  ≥ 2;t = 3,...,  T  (4) EX  it  −s ⋅(ε , , , 
Equations (3) and (4) define the GMM-difference estimator which, despite its simplicity, has 
some potential shortcomings. Lagged levels are weak instruments for the regression equation 
in differences in the presence of persistent explanatory variables (Alonso-Borrego and 
Arellano, 1999; Blundell and Bond, 1998). This raises the asymptotic variance of the 
estimator and creates a small-sample bias.
11 
To avoid these problems, below we use the GMM-system estimator that combines the 
regression in differences and in levels (Arellano and Bover 1995, Blundell and Bond 1998). 
The instruments for the regression in differences are the same as above.  The instruments 
for the regression in levels are the lagged differences of the corresponding variables.  These are 
appropriate instruments under the additional assumption of no correlation between the 
differences of these variables and the country-specific effect.  Formally, we assume  
y  E  t  i  +p ⋅η ] = y  E  t  i  +q ⋅ηi ]  and [  ,  i  [ , 
X  E  t  i  +p  = ⋅ X  E  t  i  +q ⋅η ]  q  and  p  all  for 
(5)
[  η ] [  ,  i ,  i 
This leads to additional moment conditions for the regression in levels:
12 
E[(y  − y  )⋅(η +ε )] =0  (6) , ,  , t  i  −1  t  i  −2  i  t  i 
10 Note that this still allows current and future values of the explanatory variables to be affected by the 
error term. 
11 An additional problem with the simple difference estimator relates to measurement error: differencing 
may exacerbate the bias due to errors in variables by decreasing the signal-to-noise ratio (see Griliches and 
Hausman, 1986). 
12 Given that lagged levels are used as instruments in the differences specification, only the most recent 
difference is used as instrument in the levels specification. Using other lagged differences would result in 
redundant moment conditions (see Arellano and Bover, 1995). 
11[(X  E  i ,t −1 − X i ,t −2 )⋅(ηi +εi ,t )] =0  (7) 
Using the moment conditions in equations (3), (4), (6), and (7), we employ a Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) procedure to generate consistent estimates of the parameters 
of interest and their asymptotic variance-covariance (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and 
Bover, 1995). These are given by the following formulas: 
ˆ  ' ˆ −1 ' 
−1 ' ˆ −1  ' θ = (  W  X  Ω X  W  )  W  X  Ω y  W  (8) 
ˆ  ' ˆ 1 ' 
−1 AVAR  (θ) = (  W  X  Ω
− X  W  )  (9) 
where θ is the vector of parameters of interest (α, β),  y is the dependent variable stacked 
first in differences and then in levels,  X is the explanatory-variable matrix including the 
lagged dependent variable (yt-1, X) stacked first in differences and then in levels, W is the 
ˆ matrix of instruments derived from the moment conditions, and Ω is a consistent estimate 
of the variance-covariance matrix of the moment conditions.
 13 
Consistency of the GMM estimators depends on the validity of the above moment 
conditions. This can be checked through two specification tests suggested by Arellano and 
Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). The first is a Sargan test of over-identifying 
restrictions, which tests the overall validity of the instruments by analyzing the sample analog 
of the moment conditions used in the estimation process. Failure to reject the null 
hypothesis that the conditions hold gives support to the model. Furthermore, validity of the 
additional  moment conditions required by the system estimator relative to the difference 
estimator can likewise be verified through difference Sargan tests. 
The second test examines the null hypothesis that the error term εi,t  is serially 
uncorrelated. As with the Sargan test, failure to reject the null lends support to the model.  In 
the system specification we test whether the differenced error term (that is, the residual of the 
13 In practice, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest the following two-step procedure to obtain consistent 
and efficient GMM estimates.  First, assume that the residuals, εi,t, are independent and homoskedastic 
both across countries and over time. This assumption corresponds to a specific weighting matrix that is 
used to produce first-step coefficient estimates. Then, construct a consistent estimate of the variance­
covariance matrix of the moment conditions with the residuals obtained in the first step, and use this 
matrix to re-estimate the parameters of interest (i.e. second-step estimates). Asymptotically, the second­
step estimates are superior to the first-step ones in so far as efficiency is concerned. 
12regression in differences) shows second-order serial correlation.  First-order serial correlation 
of the differenced error term is expected even if the original error term (in levels) is 
uncorrelated, unless the latter follows a random walk.  Second-order serial correlation of the 
differenced residual indicates that the original error term is serially correlated and follows a 
moving average process at least of order one. This would render the proposed instruments 
invalid (and would call for higher-order lags to be used as instruments). 
3. Empirical Assessment 
In this section we will present our baseline regression that will allow us to show the policy 
complementarities and to construct a policy index. The latter is important for the discussion 
on removing constraint, since we will have a quality of domestic policy and quality of 
external policy. The former is related to macroeconomic condition, the latter is related to 
trade and financial openness. The discussion on removing constraint is postponed for the 
next section. 
3.1 Baseline regression 
The baseline regression analysis of growth, structural determinants and the policy 
environment is reported in Table 1, and we run different specifications using alternative 
measures of financial openness —see regressions [1] through [4]. Before analyzing the 
impact of structural factors and the policy environment on growth, we need to highlight that 
our GMM-IV regressions are valid for statistical inference according to our specification 
tests. We are able to reject the null of serial correlation of higher order of the error process 
and we accept the validity of the moment conditions. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
We find evidence of transitional convergence; that is, the coefficient of initial GDP per 
capita is negative and significant throughout the different specifications in Table 1. Hence, 
conditional on other structural factors and the policy environment, poorer countries tend to 
grow faster than richer countries. 
13Regarding our structural factors, we robustly find that growth is enhanced by: (a) faster 
accumulation of human capital, (b) deeper domestic financial markets, and (c) better 
institutional quality.  In order to have an idea of the economic impact of the structural 
factors on growth we assume a one standard deviation increase in each of the structural 
factors affecting growth and we use the coefficient estimates of equation [3] in Table 1. In 
this context, a one-standard-deviation increase in the gross enrollment rate in secondary 
schooling would raise the growth rate of the economy by 1.1 percentage points per annum. 
Similar improvements in the development of local financial markets and in the quality of 
governance of the country would imply a boost in the rate of economic growth of 0.2 and 
1.05 percentage points per year, respectively. 
Our indicators of policy environment indicate that growth is higher in environments with: 
(a) low inflation rates, (b) reduced government burden, and (c) higher integration to 
international markets of goods. Again, our coefficients are statistically significant and 
economically relevant. For instance, cutting inflation in half would increase the growth rate 
of the economy by 1.8 percentage points, while reducing the government burden by half 
would lead to a surge in the growth rate of 74 basis points per year. On the other hand, 
doubling the coefficient of trade openness would yield higher growth rate by 11 basis points 
per year. 
Regarding the growth effects of financial openness, we find that when using the ratio of 
foreign liabilities to GDP as our measure of financial openness yields a negative and 
significant coefficient —regression [1] of Table 1. This suggests that higher integration to 
world financial markets may reduce growth by elevating the vulnerability of countries to 
external shocks. We argue that the negative impact of financial openness on growth may be 
the result of offsetting forces on growth: holdings of equity liabilities (FDI and portfolio 
investment liabilities) may have a positive effect on growth, whereas a faster accumulation of 
holdings of loan liabilities (bank and trade related debt) may have a negative effect. To test 
that hypothesis we include an interaction term between the ratio of foreign liabilities to GDP 
and the debt-to-equity ratio of the country. The latter indicator is proxied by the percentage 
of loan liabilities in total foreign liabilities (equity plus loan liabilities). In regression [2] of 
14Table 1, we find that the coefficient of financial openness (proxied by foreign liabilities to 
GDP) is positive and significant whereas the interaction term with debt-equity ratio is 
negative and significant. This finding basically indicates that for countries with low (high) 
debt-equity ratio, the impact of financial openness on growth is positive (negative). 
According to our regression results, higher financial openness has a positive and significant 
impact on growth for countries with a share of debt in total foreign liabilities smaller than 
45%. The result in [2] highlights the importance of the structure of external liabilities in 
explaining the impact of cumulative foreign financing flows on growth. 
Regression [3] in Table 1 includes in our regression the equity-related foreign liabilities to 
GDP ratio (see equation XX) instead of the ratio of total foreign liabilities to GDP. 
According to Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) this type of openness seems more relevant for 
evaluating the relationship between growth and financial openness. We find that equity­
related financial openness (proxied by the holdings of FDI and portfolio investment 
liabilities to GDP) has a positive and significant impact on growth. Economically speaking, 
the rate of growth per capita would increase by 14 basis points if we double the ratio of 
equity-related financial openness. 
Finally, regression [4] of Table 1 replaced foreign liabilities to GDP with its components: 
equity-related liabilities and loan-related liabilities, with both components being expressed as 
a ratio to GDP. Interestingly, we find that the equity-related financial openness has a positive 
coefficient and statistically significant whereas the loan-related financial openness has a 
negative and statistically significant effect on growth. This finding confirms the fact the 
accounting for the structure of external liabilities matters to understand the impact of 
financial openness on growth. A one standard deviation increase in the ratio of equity-related 
financial openness would lead to an increase in the growth rate of 47 basis points per year, 
while a similar increase in the loan-related financial openness would reduce growth by 83 
basis points per annum. 
3.2 Complementarities between trade and financial openness 
Recent literature highlights the interaction between trade openness and financial openness 
and its nexus to long-term growth. Aizenman and Noy (2007) argue that countries cannot 
15choose financial openness independently of their degree of trade openness in an era of 
growing trade integration. More specifically, greater trade openness would increase the cost 
of enforcing financial repression, thus reducing its use as an implicit tax. Hence, financial 
reforms become a by-product of greater trade integration. On the other hand, Kalemli-
Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha (2001) find that greater international financial integration would 
lead to better income insurance. This would induce higher specialization in production and, 
hence, higher exports and faster growth. 
Table 2 expands the results from Table 1 by including the interaction between trade 
openness and financial openness. We want to test whether financial openness and trade 
openness are complements or substitutes in the growth process.  Regression [1] of Table 2 
includes the ratio of exports and imports to GDP, the ratio of foreign liabilities to GDP, and 
the interaction between these measures of trade openness and financial openness. We find 
that the coefficient of trade openness and financial openness is negative and significant while 
the interaction term is positive and significant. Ceteris paribus, we find that the impact of 
trade openness on growth is positive in countries with higher integration to world capital 
markets, and that the impact of financial openness on growth is positive in countries with 
deeper trade integration. According to our regression estimates, the impact of trade 
openness on growth is positive in countries where foreign liabilities exceed 32% of GDP. 
On the other hand, the impact of financial openness on growth is positive in countries 
where total trade (exports and imports) is larger than 89% of GDP. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Regression [2] of Table 2 includes equity-related financial openness instead of the overall 
degree of financial openness. Again, we find that the coefficient of trade openness and the 
equity-related financial openness is negative and significant while the interaction term 
between these variables is positive and significant. This finding implies that trade (financial) 
openness has a positive impact on the growth rate of the economy for medium to high levels 
of financial (trade) openness. Specifically, the regression analysis yields a threshold level for 
financial openness of 8% of GDP and for trade openness of 38% of GDP. This suggests 
that the impact of trade openness on growth is positive in countries where equity-related 
16financial openness (proxied by equity-related foreign liabilities) exceeds 10% of GDP, and 
that the growth effects of financial openness are positive whenever trade openness is the 
country exceeds 40% of GDP. 
Finally, regressions [3] and [4] include interactions between trade openness and equity- as 
well as loan-related financial openness. Our results show that the impact of trade openness is 
positive and increasing with the ratio of equity-related foreign liabilities. On the other hand, 
rising holdings of FDI and portfolio investment liabilities may have a positive impact on 
growth in countries with medium to high trade openness (i.e. where total exports and 
imports exceed 33% of GDP). 
3.3 Constructing the index of policy environment 
The growth effects of the policy environment have been captured by a different set of 
variables and a wide array of papers has tried to tackle this issue since the work of Fischer 
(1993). Some studies are skeptical on the role of economic policies on growth (Acemoglu et 
al. 2003; Easterly, 2005), and the empirical evidence tends to favor the hypothesis that fast 
growing economies enjoy a good policy environment, but the opposite is not necessarily 
true. That is, good policies may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for growth.
14 It is 
somewhat likely to observe in the data countries with good policies and low growth as well 
as countries with poor policy environment that exhibit high growth rates. 
Given that our focus is to find complementarities among the restrictions for growth, having 
many indicators of the quality of policies (or policy environment) will increase the number of 
interactions to be used in the right hand side of our growth equation. In order to prevent 
running into problems with degrees of freedom or excess of moment conditions, we need to 
find a synthetic indicator of economic policy that summarizes the relevant information for 
our analysis.
15 In that context, Burnside and Dollar (2000) constructed a policy index based 
14 In fact, Acemoglu et al. (2003) and Easterly (2005) find that, after accounting for institutions, the 
impact of macroeconomic policies (inflation, the level of government spending, and the overvaluation of 
the real exchange rate) on growth is not statistically significant. 
15 De Macedo and Martins (2006) constructed an index of complementary of reforms for Central and 
Eastern European transition economies, based on how to eliminate distortions in a second best context. 
The indicators are constructed by the EBRD, which assigns subjectively by a number between 1(low level 
of reform) and 4 (high level) for each concept of reforms (price liberalization, stabilization, financial 
17on the contribution to growth of different policy variables (inflation, budget deficits and 
trade openness) by estimating an OLS regression of growth on initial per capita GDP, the set 
of economic policy variables and other control variables for a panel of countries including 
time effects. Using the estimated coefficients for the economic policy variables in the 
baseline regression (without interactions) a weights, they build a policy index. This approach 
has the advantage that the index is built based on the contribution of each variable to 
growth, but their main caveat is that the value of the index may vary as you change the 
control variables. Alternatively, as done by Sirimaneetham and Temple (2006), one can 
construct an index based on principal components robust to the presence of outliers. The 
advantage of this method is at the same time its main disadvantage, the weight for each 
policy variable in the index is unrelated to growth, since they are chosen to maximize the 
variance of the linear combination of factors subject to a normalization restriction.  
In this paper we follow the Burnside and Dollar methodology with some improvements. 
Instead of using the OLS coefficient of the growth regression, we use the GMM-IV estimate 
of each coefficient. As explained in section 2 above, this strategy allows us to obtain 
consistent estimates of the effect of each variable on growth.  Hence, to construct our index 
of policy environment we use the regression [3] of Table 1 where we proxy financial 
openness with the ratio of equity-related foreign liabilities to GDP.  Our policy environment 
index is constructed as the growth regression-weighted average of the following policy 
indicators: inflation (Inf), government burden (Govt), trade openness (TrdOpn) and financial 
openness (FinOpn). Using the coefficient estimates of regression [3] in Table 1, we have that 
our policy environment index (PE) becomes: 
PEit =  – 2.653 ⋅ Infit – 1.07 ⋅ Govtit  + 0.158 ⋅ TrdOpnit + 0.207 ⋅ FinOpnit 
where “good policy environments” (high values of PE) are reflected by low inflation, low 
government burden, and higher degrees of international trade and financial integration. 
Furthermore, we decompose our policy environment index (PE) in two groups: (i) the index 
of domestic policy environment (DPE) that captures the ability of the government to keep 
price stability and low government distortions, and (ii) the index of outward policy 
environment (OPE) which depicts the degree of outward orientation of the economy to the 
reform, mechanisms of exit and mechanisms of entry). That information is not available for a larger set of 
countries. 
18 international goods and capital markets. Hence, the DPE is constructed using the 
information on the inflation rate and government consumption expenditure, whereas the 
OPE is calculated using data on trade and financial openness. Specifically, using the 
coefficient estimates of regression [3] in Table 1, DPEit =  – 2.653 ⋅ Infit – 1.07 ⋅ Govtit , while 
OPEit =  0.158 ⋅ TrdOpnit + 0.207 ⋅ FinOpnit .  Note that, in both cases, the higher the value of 
the (DPE and OPE) indices, the better is the quality of (domestic and outward) policies. 
Finally, note that all indices (PE, DPE, and OPE) have been normalized so that they take 
values between 0 and 1, and higher values of these indices imply a better economic policy 
environment.
16 
Figure 1 shows that countries in the lowest quartiles of the index of policy environment 
display higher inflation rates, larger government burden, greater international trade and 
financial integration. On average, countries in the bottom quartile of the distribution of the 
policy environment (PE) index have an inflation rate of 41%, general government 
consumption of 18.5% of GDP, exports and imports of 44.4% of GDP, and foreign 
liabilities of 33.3% of GDP. On the other hand, countries in the top quartile of the PE 
distribution have a lower average rate of inflation (6.2%), government consumption of 9.4% 
of GDP, exports and imports of 64% of GDP, and foreign liabilities of approximately 80% 
of GDP. 
Interestingly, we also show in Figure 1 that the growth rate of GDP per capita rises as the 
policy environment improves. The rate of economic growth is, on average, 0.7% for 
countries in the bottom quartile of policy environment (“bad policies”) and it is 2.4% for 
countries in the top quartile of policy environment (“good policies”). On the other hand, we 
also find that, as the quality of the policy environment improves, growth volatility declines 
although at decreasing rates. 
16 We normalize the index of policy environment by performing the following operation: 
~  x 
x =
x − }  min{ 
where x represents the PE, DPE and OPE indices. Note that max{ x} and 
}  max{  − }  min{  x x 
min{x} indicate the maximum and the minimum value of the x process. 
19 Next, we evaluate the significance of complementarities between economic policies and 
structural factors by examining the concordance between economic growth and the policy 
environment. We observe that 9.2% of our sample of country-periods is conformed by 
countries with low growth and bad policy environment (both indicators in the lowest quartile 
of the distribution). Note that as the policy environment moves from the lowest to higher 
quartiles of its respective distributions, the number of countries with low growth rates 
declines. Only 4.2% of country episodes display high-quality policy environments and poor 
growth performance (PE in the top quartile and growth in the bottom quartile). As policy 
environment improves, the number of countries with higher growth rates increase: 7.1% of 
the distribution of country episodes have good policies and high growth (both indicators in 
the top quartile of their respectively distributions). Finally, note that these results hold when 
we undertake the same analysis for domestic and outward policy environments.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
In addition, we report the average growth rate for countries with different levels of domestic 
and outward policy environment. On average, we find that the lowest growth rate in GDP 
per capita (0.09%) is achieved by countries with poor domestic and outward policy 
environments (DPE and OPE in the bottom quartiles). If we hold constant DPE at its 
lowest quartile, better OPE would render higher growth. Analogously, keeping OPE at the 
bottom quartile, improvements in DPE would render higher growth rates (although not 
monotonically). Interestingly we find that the growth rate rises monotonically if DPE 
improves given that the economy is outward oriented (OPE in the top quartile): it jumps 
from 0.09 to 1.6%.  Growth rises although non-monotonically if OPE improves while the 
economy has achieved macroeconomic stability (DPE in the top quartile). The growth rate, 
in this case, moves from 1.5% for almost closed economies to 3.44% for very open 
economies (bottom and top quartiles of the distribution of OPE respectively).  In sum, we 
find some preliminary evidence that good policy environment is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for economic growth. 
204 Removing the constraints to growth: Economic policy and 
structural factors 
The main goal of the present paper is to evaluate the importance of complementarities in the 
growth process. Despite the abundant evidence on the drivers of long-term growth, the issue 
of policy complementarities is not properly addressed in the empirical literature and it is 
critical in determining whether policies can help promote growth in developing countries. 
The fact that policies interact in a complex way and that policy complementarities may 
account for differences in growth experiences implies that rather than focusing on the 
efficacy of a determined policy alone, we should focus on its success as an integral part of a 
combination of policies. 
This paper proposes to undertake this road by examining: (i) the existence of 
complementarities between structural factors (such as, human capital, financial development, 
and governance) and the policy environment (comprised by inflation, government burden, 
trade openness and financial openness). In this case, we will test whether reforms to 
promote more accumulation of human capital, deeper domestic financial markets and better 
quality of governance depend on the level of policy environment in the country. (ii) We also 
test whether the good quality of macroeconomic policies and the outward orientation of the 
economy (summarized in the index of policy environment as well as in its domestic and 
outward components) may help shield the economy from volatile shocks –either from policy 
or external factors. 
Structural factors and the overall policy environment 
In regressions [1] through [4] of Table 4, we include our index of policy environment, PE 
(instead of the four policy indicators present in Table 1), and the interaction between the PE 
index and output per capita, human capital, financial development and institutional quality. 
We introduce these interactions one by one and we find the following results: the PE index 
has a positive and statistically significant coefficient regardless of the specification, while the 
interaction term between PE and each structural factor (introduced one by one) is negative 
and statistically significant.  We first look at per capita income, more precisely at the 
21interaction between initial GDP per capita and the index of policy environment —regression 
[1]. The results suggest that the policy environment matters for convergence: the better the 
policy environment, the faster the convergence of poorer nations. On the other hand, this 
finding also suggests that the growth benefits of the policy environment are higher in low- 
and middle-income economies. Next we turn to the interaction between human capital and 
the policy environment —regression [2]. Again, we find that the interaction is negative while 
human capital and the policy environment has a positive and significant coefficient. Better 
policy environments provide higher growth benefits in countries with low to medium levels 
of human capital, while the impact of human capital on growth is the largest in countries 
with low to medium policy environments. Regression [3] includes the interaction between 
PE and financial depth and regression [4] adds instead the interaction of PE and institutional 
quality. The results are qualitatively similar: growth effects of PE are the largest in countries 
with low to medium levels of the structural factors and reforms in structural factors renders 
higher growth benefits in countries with low to medium PE. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Typically, income per capita, human capital, financial depth and institutions are highly 
correlated (Barro and Lee, 2001; Beck et al. 2001; Dollar and Kraay, 2003). Furthermore, to 
the extent that real income per capita may reflect economic development, it usually entails 
higher levels of educational attainment, more developed domestic financial markets, and 
stronger institutions. In this context, the findings may lead to rather unsurprising —and 
policy irrelevant— corollaries: (i) richer countries have smaller marginal benefits from higher 
quality policy environment, and (ii) the marginal growth effects of structural factors are the 
highest in low- to medium-income countries. Regressions [5] and [6] dispel these doubts: 
when we put together all these structural factors, all variables and interactions remain 
statistically significant. Interestingly, we find that the speed of convergence towards the 
steady state is higher in countries with better policy environments —see figure 3(i). Also, 
human capital and governance have a positive effect on growth that dies out in countries 
with the very high-quality policy environment —see figures 3(ii) and 3(iv).  
22In contrast, the interaction between financial depth and policy environment is positive and 
statistically significant. Figure 3(iii) shows that domestic capital market reforms may have a 
detrimental impact on growth in countries with low-quality economic policies. At the same 
time, financial market reforms can boost the growth rate of the economy in countries with 
high-quality policy environments. In addition, we also find that the effectiveness of better 
policy environments in raising growth is enhanced in countries with deeper financial 
markets. 
Structural factors, domestic and outward policy environment 
Table 5 decomposes the overall index of policy environment into its domestic and outward 
policy components (DPE and OPE, respectively) and we include the interaction between 
each structural factor with OPE and DPE. Again, regressions [1] through [4] includes the 
interaction of each structural factor (say, income per capita, human capital, financial depth 
and institutions) with DPE and OPE, separately. Moreover, regressions [5] and [6] include 
all possible interaction between structural factors and the domestic and outward policy 
environments. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
When analyzing each interaction separately we find qualitatively similar results to those of 
Table 4: first, healthier domestic and outward policy environments enhance growth. Second, 
countries with better domestic and outward policy environments tend to converge faster to 
steady state. Third, the marginal effects of healthier DPE and OPE dies out as the country 
reaches the highest levels of education, financial development and institutional quality. 
Finally, the largest potential growth benefits from reforms in education, domestic capital 
markets and governance are accrued by countries with low to medium policy environment, 
while the marginal benefits of structural changes for countries with the highest levels of 
DPE and OPE are statistically not different from zero. Regressions [5] and [6] of Table 5 
include the interaction of the structural factors with DPE and with OPE and allows to 
identify whether the interaction between the policy environment (either domestic or outward 
one) and each of the structural factors does not merely reflect economic development. In 
what follows, we will focus our discussion in regression [6] of Table 5. 
23We first look at the impact of initial income per capita. We find that the coefficient of initial 
GDP per capita is positive and significant, its interaction with DPE i s  n e g a t i v e  a n d 
significant whereas the interaction of income per capita and OPE is negative and not 
statistically significant. Figure 4(i) shows the growth effect of a one-standard-deviation 
increase in output conditional on DPE (and with the level of OPE constant on the median 
sample value). Countries with low DPE show a very slow speed of mean reversion to 
deviations from the steady state, while there is evidence of transitional convergence for 
countries with medium to high DPE (ceteris paribus the level of OPE). On the other hand, 
Figure 5(i) evidence of a negative relationship between initial output per capita and the 
growth rate conditional on the different levels of OPE (and provided that the DPE is set at 
its median level). 
Next we look at the impact of human capital on growth conditional on domestic and 
outward policy environments. Here, we find that the while the coefficient of human capital is 
positive and significant, their interaction coefficients with DPE and OPE are negative and 
statistically different from zero. Figure 4(ii) shows that human capital has a positive and 
significant impact on growth for low and medium levels of DPE, with the effect dying out as 
the country reaches highest levels of DPE. A one standard deviation increase in human 
capital at the median values of DPE and OPE would elevate the growth rate by 29 basis 
points per year (and is statistically significant at the 10% level). Note that beyond the median 
value of DPE, the growth effect of human capital is statistically insignificant in most cases. 
Figure 5(ii) shows similar results to 4(ii): the growth impact of rising human capital is 
positive (but declining) in countries with low to medium levels of OPE, and it becomes non­
significant in countries with high levels of OPE. 
The results for financial development are striking. First, the coefficient estimate of domestic 
credit to the private sector is negative and statistically not significant, its interaction with 
DPE is positive and significant while its interaction with OPE is negative and not significant. 
The growth effect of rising financial depth by one standard deviation conditional on DPE 
and OPE is depicted in Figure 4(iii) and 5(iii), respectively. Figure 4(iii) depicts the growth 
response to a one-standard deviation increase in the ratio of private credit to GDP 
conditional on DPE (while keeping OPE constant at its median value). It shows that 
24reforms in the domestic financial markets may have a deleterious impact on growth in 
countries with low levels of DPE —that is, in countries with high inflation and heavy 
government burden. On the other hand, financial development would boost the growth rate 
of the economy in countries with low and stable inflation and reduced government burden. 
Note that conditional on DPE and OPE being at their median values, a one standard 
deviation increase in private credit would raise the growth rate by 33 basis points. On the 
other hand, figure 5(iii) illustrates the response of the growth rate to a one-standard 
deviation increase in financial development conditional on OPE (while keeping DPE 
constant at its median value). In this case, the growth effect of financial development is 
positive and significant in countries with low to medium levels of OPE, and the growth 
impact dies out as the level of OPE increases to the high quartiles of the distribution. That 
is, private credit appears to be a substitute factor to trade and financial openness in the 
growth process. Given an increase in private credit, countries with higher trade and financial 
openness would reap smaller growth benefits from financial development. The negative 
interaction between financial openness and domestic financial development could be 
attributed to the fact that: (a) exporting firms with lack of access to world capital markets 
may rely more heavily on domestic financing sources, or (b) firms may find more diverse 
sources of financing in less regulated world capital markets. 
Finally, we examine the role of institutions in the growth process. The coefficient of 
institutional quality is negative and significant, its interaction with DPE is also negative and 
significant while its interaction with OPE is positive and significant. The conditional 
response of the growth rate to improvements in governance (i.e. a one standard deviation 
increase in the ICRG index of political risk) conditional on DPE and OPE is depicted in 
Figures 4(iv) and 5(iv), respectively. We first discuss the response of growth to a one­
standard deviation increase in institutional quality conditional on DPE (with OPE constant 
at the median level). We find that regardless of the level of DPE, the impact of better 
institutions on growth per capita is positive and significant, with the growth rate being raised 
by 1.25 percentage points per year conditional on both DPE and OPE being at their median 
values. Ceteris paribus the OPE level (at its median sample value), a one-standard deviation 
increase in institutional quality would increase the growth rate by 1.52 percentage points for 
countries with low DPE (10
th percentile) and by 0.97 basis points for countries with high 
25DPE (90
th percentile). Figure 5(iv), on the other hand, shows the response of the growth rate 
to a one standard deviation increase in institutional quality conditional to OPE and given the 
DPE level. Here we find that institutional reforms may have an adverse effect on growth for 
countries with low levels of OPE —that is, countries the have closed trade and capital 
account regimes. However, as economies liberalized their trade regime and their capital 
account, the impact of higher institutional quality on growth is higher. Hence, institutional 
quality and the outward orientation policies (in the world markets of goods and capital) are 
complements in the growth process.  
Summary of results 
Table 6 summarizes the growth response of a one standard deviation increase in structural 
factors —say, income per capita, human capital, financial development, and institutional 
quality— conditional on the quality of economic policies —as proxied by the index of policy 
environment. In additional, we also report the growth response conditional on the quality of 
both domestic and outward policies. Note that when we compute the response conditional 
to bad domestic policies (10
th percentile row) and good domestic policies (90
th percentile), we 
keep outward policies constant at the median value. The same approach is undertaken when 
computing the growth response conditional to good or bad outward policies. Also note that 
we report the difference in the growth response to a change in a structural factor conditional 
on good and bad policies as well as the p-value of a Chi-square test that examines the 
equality of these responses. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
We first find that the speed of convergence towards steady state is faster in poorer countries 
with healthy policy environments. In other words, poorer countries tend to growth faster 
provided that they have a “good” policy environment. We should note that this result is 
mainly driven by improvements in the domestic policy environment (DPE). Hence, 
achieving low inflation and reduced government burden is crucial for poorer countries to 
growth at faster rates and catch-up with richer countries. Second, human capital has a 
positive and significant impact on growth in countries with good and bad policy 
environments, although the marginal growth effect is smaller as the policy environment 
26improves. When breaking down the index of policy environment into its DPE and OPE 
components, we find that the growth effect of rising human capital dies out in countries with 
“good” domestic and outward policy environments. A possible explanation of this result 
relies on the fact that for countries with “good” outward policy environments (that is, high 
degree of integration to world markets of goods and assets), the expansion of (secondary) 
education is not a sufficient condition. It may require higher levels of R&D investment as 
well as an expansion of higher education and on-the-job-training as well as a more efficient 
allocation of talent towards more productive (instead of rent-seeking) activities. Third, 
financial market development have a negative or negligible impact on growth in countries 
with bad policy environments, and the growth effect of financial depth increases as the 
policy environments improves. For instance, the impact of a one-standard-deviation increase 
in private credit to GDP on growth is 13 basis points in countries with average policy 
environment (PE), and 23 basis points in countries with good PE. We should note that this 
finding is mainly driven by the interaction between financial depth and DPE. We find that 
the complementarities between policy environment and financial development are mainly 
explained by the key role of low inflation and reduced government burden in enhancing the 
effect of deeper domestic financial markets on growth. Here, the impact of a one-standard-
deviation increase in private credit to GDP on growth is 33 basis points in countries with 
average domestic policy environment (DPE), and 57 basis points in countries with good 
DPE. Finally, we find that the impact of higher quality of institutions on growth is positive 
regardless of the level of policy environment index, although the growth effect decreases as 
the PE index rises. This behavior is also exhibited by the interaction between DPE and the 
quality of institutions. On the other hand, we find that an improvement in the quality of 
institutions is either detrimental or has a negligible impact on growth in countries with 
closed trade and capital account regimes. In addition, the impact of better governance on 
growth is positive and increases as the outward policies render higher degrees of integration 
to world markets of goods and assets. 
5. Aggregate volatility, economic policy and growth 
An important strand of research that examines the negative cross-country relation between 
average GDP growth and output volatility has been developed since the influential work of 
27Ramey and Ramey (1995). For instance, Hnatkovska and Loayza (2004) provide robust 
evidence on the negative effect of aggregate volatility on growth, and that this adverse effect 
is larger in economies with low-income levels, weak institutions and bad policies.
17 
Consistent with the empirical literature, we find a negative relationship between growth and 
output volatility and our estimates indicate that doubling output volatility would reduce the 
growth rate by 1.2 percentage points (see Table A.3). We argue that output volatility can be 
attributed to either policy volatility or the volatility of external shocks. In Table A.3 we 
report that either rising policy volatility or more volatile external shocks (terms of trade 
shocks, external demand growth or world real interest rates) would cause a drop in growth 
rates. 
The main goal of this section is to evaluate whether a good policy environment protects the 
economy from aggregate volatility, and more specifically from more volatile domestic and 
foreign shocks. Furthermore, we evaluate whether good domestic and/or outward policy 
environments shield the economy from volatile shocks. 
Growth volatility and the policy environment 
Table 7 reports the growth regression conditional on structural factors, the policy 
environment (PE) index, growth volatility and the interaction between growth volatility and 
the PE index. To address the likely endogenous impact of aggregate volatility on growth we 
use two different strategies of estimation: (a) internal instruments, where we use lagged levels 
and differences of growth volatility as instruments, and (b) external instruments, where we use 
the (actual and lagged values of) terms of trade volatility, external demand growth volatility 
and the volatility of world real interest rates as instruments. For the sake of brevity we will 
focus our discussion on the results with external instruments —regressions [3] and [4] in 
Table 7. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
17 They have also shown that the negative effect of volatility on growth has increased in recent years due 
to deeper recessions. 
28Aggregate volatility exerts a negative influence on economic growth, and this adverse effect 
is mitigated by good policy environments —regression [3] of Table 7.  Figure 6(i) depicts the 
growth response to doubling the standard deviation of growth per capita conditional to the 
level of the policy environment index. For the representative country in the distribution of 
the policy environment (PE) index, doubling growth volatility would reduce the rate of 
economic growth by 1.28 percentage points. The drop in the growth rate would be smaller in 
countries with better policy environments —say, a growth reduction of 1.2 percentage points 
for countries in the 90
th percentile of the distribution of the PE index. 
Regression [4] of Table 7 decomposes the PE index into its domestic and outward policy 
environment indices (DPE and OPE, respectively). Again, we find that the coefficient of 
growth volatility is negative and significant (at the 5% level); however, the interaction 
between DPE and growth volatility as well as between OPE and growth volatility shows an 
interesting pattern. Note that while the interaction between DPE and growth volatility has a 
positive and significant coefficient, the coefficient estimate of the interaction between OPE 
and growth volatility is negative and significant. These results imply that: (i) the adverse 
impact of aggregate volatility on growth is mitigated by monetary and fiscal policies that 
maintain inflation and government burden at low levels, and (ii) the growth decline due to 
rising aggregate volatility is exacerbated in countries with higher trade and financial 
openness. Regarding the influence of openness on the effect of volatility on growth, Kose et 
al. (2004) found that both trade and financial openness turn the negative effect of volatility 
on growth into a positive one. However, Hnatkovska and Loayza (2004) reject an 
ameliorating influence of international trade integration on the negative volatility-growth 
effect. 
Figure 6(ii) shows that the better the domestic policy environment —that is, the lower the 
rate of inflation and the government burden are—  the lower is the growth reduction due to 
rising inequality. Doubling aggregate volatility would reduce growth by 67 basis points for 
the representative countries (with sample median values for DPE and OPE). Conditional on 
the median value of OPE, we find that growth would decline even further (92 basis points) 
in countries with poor DPE (10
th percentile). On the other hand, the drop in the growth rate 
due to rising volatility is smaller (41 basis points) in countries with good DPE. 
29Figure 6(iii) shows that the high OPE (reflected in higher trade and financial openness) 
might exacerbate the impact of volatility on growth, thus making the economy more 
vulnerable to volatile shocks to output. Again, conditional on the median value of the DPE 
we find that doubling volatility would reduce growth by 11 basis points in countries with 
closed trade and financial openness (10
th percentile of OPE) and by 1.14 percentage points 
in countries with open trade and financial openness (90
th percentile of OPE). 
Policy volatility and the policy environment 
As we said before, rising growth volatility could be attributed to the volatility of economic 
policy or to sharp fluctuations in external conditions. Fatás and Mihov (2006) argue that 
policy volatility is a better proxy of the quality of macroeconomic policy than outcome 
measures that capture the levels of policy instruments. In turn, they suggest that the quality 
of macroeconomic policies is what matters for long-term growth.
18 
We follow Fatás and Mihov (2006) in constructing an indicator that captures discretionary 
economic policies. We denote discretionary changes in economic policies to those changes 
that are unrelated to the economy cycle (see methodology of construction in Section 2). 
Column [2] of Table A.3 shows the regression of the rate of growth per capita on 
transitional convergence, structural factors, the index of policy environment and the measure 
of policy volatility. We find that growth is enhanced by a good economic policy environment 
and by lower policy volatility. In contrast to the findings in Easterly (2005), we find that both 
the level and the volatility of macroeconomic policies affect long-term growth.  
Next, we include the interaction between the index of policy environment and the policy 
volatility in our regression equation —see regression [1] of Table 8. Consistent with our 
results in Table 7, we find that good policy environments foster growth and that high policy 
volatility deters growth. In addition, we find that the interaction coefficient between the PE 
index and policy volatility is positive and significant. That is, the adverse impact of high 
18 Friedman (1977) suggests that high inflation does not change the natural rate of unemployment. 
However, rising inflation volatility can generate severe economic inefficiencies and have an adverse effect 
on long-term performance of the country by raising its natural rate of unemployment. 
30policy volatility on growth is mitigated in countries with better policy environments. Figure 
7(i) shows the growth response to doubling fiscal policy volatility conditional on selected 
percentiles of the PE index. We find that growth declines in countries with very poor PE 
and that the growth impact becomes statistically negligible in countries with higher PE 
values. 
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
Finally, we include the DPE and OPE components of the PE index as well as their 
interaction with policy volatility in our regression equation —see regression [1] of Table 9. 
Better domestic and outward policy environments promote growth while higher policy 
volatility hinders long-term economic performance. In addition, we find that the interaction 
between DPE and policy volatility is positive and significant whereas the one between OPE 
and policy volatility is not statistically different from zero. Our findings suggest that 
maintaining low inflation rates and a reduced government burden (which reflects higher 
values of DPE) would shield the economy from fluctuations in discretionary fiscal policies. 
On the other hand, the outward orientation of the economy (as measured by the degree of 
international trade and financial integration) neither magnifies nor mitigates the adverse 
effects of policy volatility on economic growth. Figure 8(i) and 8(ii) depict the growth 
response to doubling policy volatility conditional on domestic and outward policy 
environment, respectively. Note that while growth declines more in countries with low DPE, 
the growth response to policy volatility remains almost invariant to the level of OPE. 
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
External volatility and the policy environment 
Rising growth volatility can also be explained by sharp fluctuations in external shocks. Here 
we consider the volatility of terms of trade shocks (Vdp*), the volatility of external demand 
(Vdy*) and the volatility of world real interest rates (Vdr*). In Table A.3 we run our baseline 
regressions including each factor one by one (regressions [3] through [5] in Table A.3), 
including the three volatilities altogether (regression [6] of Table A.3), and putting instead  an 
aggregate index of the volatility of external shocks which we construct from the growth 
regression estimates in column [6] of Table A.3 as follows: 
31Vdx* = 0.204 Vdp* + 0.679 Vdy* + 0.747 Vdr* 
where we only take the absolute value of the coefficients of Vdp*,  Vdy* and Vdr* in 
regression [6] of Table A.3. Note that higher values of our aggregate index Vdx* implies 
higher external volatility. Regression [7] of Table A.3 shows that higher aggregate external 
volatility hampers growth. 
Table 8 shows the impact of external volatility on growth conditional on the aggregate policy 
environment (PE) index. Regression [2] shows that good policy environment and lower 
aggregate external volatility (lower Vdx*) enhance growth. Also note that the interaction 
between Vdx* and the PE index is positive although not statistically significant. Figure 7(ii) 
shows that the growth response to doubling Vdx* remains almost invariant between the 10
th 
and 90
th percentile of the PE index. When including Vdp*, Vdy* and Vdr* one by one in our 
regression framework —regressions [3] through [5] in Table 8— we find that the impact of 
PE is positive and significant in most cases, whereas the effect of rising volatility in each 
external shocks is negative and significant. Also note that the interaction between the PE 
index and the volatility of each external shock (say, Vdp*, Vdy* and Vdr*) is positive and 
significant. That is, when introducing each external shock one-by-one, the impact of growth 
is negative but softened in countries with good policy environment.  
In regression [6] we include the volatility all external shocks considered here and their 
interactions with the PE index. Interestingly we still find that fluctuations in external shocks 
related to trade (say, volatility of terms of trade shocks and external demand volatility) have a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient, whereas as the volatility of the real world 
interest rate has a positive and insignificant coefficient. When interacting with the PE index, 
we find that good policy environments help abate the negative impact of higher volatility of 
terms of trade shocks and higher volatility of external demand growth. However, the 
coefficient that captures the interaction between the PE index and the volatility of world real 
interest rates is negative but statistically not different from zero. Figures 8(iii), 8(iv) and 8(v) 
depict the response of the growth rate of the economy to rising volatility in terms of trade, 
external demand, and real world interest rates, respectively, conditional on the PE index. The 
32figures confirm the results from our regressions: better policy environments cushion the 
adverse impact on growth of rising terms of trade volatility or external demand volatility. On 
the other hand, the growth impact of the volatility of world real interest rates is statistically 
not different from zero regardless of the PE level. 
Table 9 includes the DPE and OPE indices rather than the aggregate PE index, and interacts 
both DPE and OPE with the volatility of external shocks. Regression [2] of Table 9 presents 
the analysis for the aggregate index of external volatility, Vdx*, and its interaction with DPE 
and  OPE indices. Our results show that growth is promoted by a good domestic and 
outward policy environment. We also find that the coefficient of aggregate external volatility 
is positive although not statistically different from zero. On the other hand, the coefficient 
for the interaction between Vdx* and DPE is negative while the interaction between Vdx* 
and OPE is positive. Hence our results suggest that rising aggregate volatility of external 
shocks can be diversified away in countries with open trade regimes and capital accounts. 
Regressions [3] through [5] of Table 9 includes in the growth regression the volatility of each 
external sector one by one (Vdp*, Vdy* and Vdr*) and their interactions with DPE and 
OPE. We find that the coefficient of Vdp*, Vdy* is negative and statistically significant while 
the coefficient of Vdr* is negative and statistically not different from zero. When interacting 
DPE and OPE with Vdp*, we find that the growth effect rising terms of trade volatility is 
cushioned by both good domestic and policy environments —regression [3] of Table 9. The 
response to rising external demand volatility, on the other hand, is cushioned by good 
domestic policy environments but exacerbated in countries with open trade and capital 
accounts —see regression [4] of Table 9.  Finally, we find that higher volatility of world real 
interest rates is cushioned in countries that are highly integrated to world capital and goods 
markets. 
Furthermore, regression [6] includes all three external volatilities (Vdp*, Vdy* and Vdr*) and 
their interaction terms with DPE and OPE. Interestingly, we find the coefficients of Vdp*, 
Vdy* and Vdr* are negative and significant, with the exception of Vdy*. That is, growth is 
harmed by highly volatile shocks in terms of trade and volatile movements in world real 
interest rates. We find that the adverse growth effects of rising terms of trade volatility are 
33diversified away in countries with open trade and capital accounts —see Figure 9.2(i). On the 
other hand, the impact of rising external demand volatility on growth is exacerbated in 
countries with open trade and capital accounts —see Figure 9.2(ii)— and abated in countries 
with good quality monetary and fiscal policies —see Figure 9.1(ii). Finally, we find that the 
negative growth effects of volatile real world interest rates are mitigated in countries with 
open trade regimes and capital accounts —see Figure 9.2(iii). 
Finally, Table 10 presents the role of the policy environment in either magnifying or 
reducing the impact of rising volatility on economic growth. Statistically, we find that having 
a good policy environment may explain the different responses to rising terms of trade 
volatility and external demand volatility. The same cannot be said about the volatility of 
world real interest rates. 
[INSERT TABLE 10 HERE] 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has shown the level of complementarities between policies. It is clear that policies 
interact in a complex way and that policy complementarities may account for differences in 
growth experiences implies that rather than focusing on the efficacy of a determined policy 
alone, we should focus on its success as an integral part of a combination of policies. In this 
paper, starting from a baseline regression using panel data of countries, we construct a policy 
index, which is divided in two. Domestic policy index is composes by inflation and budget 
deficit; higher value of the index means low inflation and higher government budget surplus. 
External policy index comprise trade and financial openness; a more open economy implies 
a higher value for the index. 
First of all, domestic and external policies show a high level of complementarities. This 
means that doing well in macro (inflation, fiscal budget) will help growth, especially if it is 
accompanied by openness. Second, the policy environment index constructed shows 
complementarities with structural factors such as initial GDP, human capital, quality of 
34institutions and financial depth. Third, good policy environment mitigates the volatility of 
shocks on the economy. 
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37Appendix I 
Sample of Countries 
Latin America and the Caribbean (21): Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, El Salvador, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Uruguay, Venezuela. 
East Asia and the Pacific (7): China, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Papua 
New Guinea, Singapore, Thailand. 
Industrial Economies (22): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, 
Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, United States. 
Middle East and North Africa (8): Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, 
Tunisia, Turkey. 
South Asia (3): India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka. 
Sub-Saharan Africa (15): Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, the Gambia, Kenya, 




76 countries, 1960-2000 (5-year period observations) 
Correlation 
Average  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum  with Growth 
Growth  1.50  2.65  -7.94  10.13  1.00 
Initial GDP per capita (log)  8.55  0.98  6.24  10.24  0.21 
Structural Factors and Institutions 
Secondary Enrollment (log)  3.78  0.74  1.30  4.92  0.23 
Private Credit (% GDP, log)  3.51  0.84  0.57  5.43  0.26 
Institutions (ICRG, log)  4.12  0.29  3.34  4.57  0.34 
Policy Environment Variables: 
Inflation Rate (CPI, log differences)  4.74  0.18  4.59  6.14  -0.30 
Government Consumption (% GDP, log)  2.68  0.36  1.47  3.64  -0.05 
Trade (Export & Import as % GDP, log)  3.92  0.62  2.02  5.79  0.02 
Financial Openness (% GDP, log)
 - Foreign Assets and Liabilities  2.54  1.33  -4.40  6.31  0.17
 - Foreign Liabilities  2.32  1.25  -4.40  5.54  0.16 
Policy Index 1 (PI1)  3.06  0.92  -3.10  5.88  0.24 
Policy Index 2 (PI2)  3.11  0.95  -3.43  5.97  0.25 
See notes in Tables 2 and 3 in reference to the policy environment index. 
39 Table 1 
Policy complementarities and growth:  Baseline regressions 
Dependent Variable: Growth in real GDP per capita 
Estimation method: System GMM-IV including time dummies 
Variables  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
I. Policy Environment
 1.1 Domestic 
Inflation  -1.964 **  -1.247 **  -2.653 **  -1.369 **
 (CPI, log differences )  (0.18)  (0.15)  (0.16)  (0.21) 
Government Burden  -1.352 **  -0.740 **  -1.070 **  -1.083 **
 (GG Consumption as % GDP, logs)  (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.09)
 1.2 External 
Trade Openness (TO)  0.483 **  0.208 **  0.158 **  0.623 **
 (Exports and imports as % of GDP, logs)  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.10) 
Financial Openness (FO)  -0.376 **  2.227 **  ..  .. 
(as % of GDP, logs )  (0.11)  (0.34) 
Foreign Liabilities * (Debt/Equity) ratio  ..  -0.587 **  ..  .. 
(0.06) 
Equity-related financial openness  ..  ..  0.207 **  0.338 **
 (as % of GDP, logs )  (0.05)  (0.04) 
Loan-related financial openness  ..  ..  ..  -1.098 **
 (as % of GDP, logs )  (0.06) 
II. Structural Factors 
Human Capital  1.480 **  1.803 **  1.425 **  1.533 **
 (Secondary gross enrollment rate, logs)  (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.12) 
Financial Depth  0.424 **  0.369 **  0.242 **  0.156 **
 (Private Credit as % of GDP, logs)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
Institutions  3.574 **  3.948 **  3.563 **  3.717 **
 (ICRG Political risk index, logs)  (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.18)  (0.18) 
III. Transitional Convergence 
Initial GDP per capita  -0.786 **  -1.067 **  -0.725 **  -0.755 **
 (in logs)  (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Countries  101  101  101  101 
Observations  608  608  608  608 
Specification Tests (p-value)
 - Sargan  (0.26)  (0.20)  (0.24)  (0.27)
 - 2nd. Order Correlation  (0.85)  (0.83)  (0.75)  (0.92) 
Figures below the coefficient estimates represent robust standard errors. * (**): significant at the 10 (5) % level. Table 2 
Trade and financial openness: Complements or substitutes? 
Dependent Variable: Growth in real GDP per capita 
Estimation method: System GMM-IV including time dummies 
Variables  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
I. Policy Environment
 1.1 Domestic 
Inflation  -1.858 **  -2.720 **  -0.671 **  -1.682 **
 (CPI, log differences )  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.14)  (0.23) 
Government Burden  -1.304 **  -0.909 **  -1.172 **  -0.958 **
 (GG Consumption as % GDP, logs)  (0.17)  (0.14)  (0.16)  (0.12)
 1.2 External 
Trade Openness (TO)  -2.521 **  -0.836 **  1.383 **  0.882 **
 (Exports and imports as % of GDP, logs)  (0.57)  (0.18)  (0.25)  (0.42) 
Financial Openness (FO)  -3.257 **  ..  0.175  .. 
(as % of GDP, logs )  (0.55)  (0.30) 
Equity-related financial openness  ..  -1.476 **  ..  -2.150 **
 (as % of GDP, logs )  (0.21)  (0.33) 
Loan-related financial openness  ..  ..  ..  0.642
 (as % of GDP, logs )  (0.55) 
Interaction between TO and FO 
Trade Openness x Financial openness  0.726 **  ..  ..  .. 
(0.14) 
Trade Openness x Equity-related  ..  0.406 **  0.083 **  0.612 **
 financial openness  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.08) 
Trade Openness x Loan-related  ..  ..  -0.265 **  -0.458 **
 financial openness  (0.05)  (0.14) 
II. Structural Factors 
Human Capital  1.440 **  1.540 **  1.270 **  1.657 **
 (Secondary gross enrollment rate, logs)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.16)  (0.12) 
Financial Depth  0.361 **  0.112 *  0.562 **  0.033
 (Private Credit as % of GDP, logs)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.07) 
Institutions  3.483 **  3.660 **  2.759 **  3.880 **
 (ICRG Political risk index, logs)  (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.25)  (0.21) 
III. Transitional Convergence 
Initial GDP per capita  -0.802 **  -0.734 **  -0.811 **  -0.783 **
 (in logs)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.07) 
Countries  101  101  101  101 
Observations  608  608  608  608 
Specification Tests (p-value)
 - Sargan  (0.25)  (0.23)  (0.25)  (0.21)
 - 2nd. Order Correlation  (0.95)  (0.72)  (0.99)  (0.72) 
Figures below the coefficient estimates represent robust standard errors. * (**): significant at the 10 (5) % level. Table 3 
Growth, aggregate volatility and the policy environment 
3.1 Growth in real GDP per capita  1/
 (percent per annum)
 Outward Policy
 Environment 
I  II  III  IV 
I  0.09  0.36  0.49  1.60 
Domestic Policy  II  2.43  2.00  1.47  2.29 
Environment  III  2.42  1.50  1.73  2.99 
IV  1.53  1.96  1.54  3.44 
3.2 Growth Volatility  2/
 (Std. Dev. Growth in real output per capita, in logs)
 Outward Policy
 Environment 
I  II  III  IV 
I  1.32  1.16  1.03  0.94 
Domestic Policy  II  1.15  0.77  0.96  0.57 
Environment  III  0.99  0.83  0.84  0.77 
IV  1.13  0.68  0.98  0.68 
3.3 Concordance between growth and policies  3/
 (Number of cases)
 Policy
 Environment 
I  II  III  IV 
I  76  50  46  35 
Economic  II  41  63  44  59 
Growth  III  41  52  61  55 
IV  49  43  56  59
 Domestic Policy
 Environment 
I  II  III  IV 
I  101  45  60  47 
Economic  II  55  77  51  68 
Growth  III  46  76  67  70 
IV  52  56  76  69
 Outward Policy
 Environment 
I  II  III  IV 
I  61  54  58  36 
Economic  II  46  52  60  50 
Growth  III  47  58  53  52 
IV  53  45  38  71 
1/ We report the average growth in real GDP per capita for countries in selected quartiles of the sample distribution 
of domestic and outward policy environment. The (i, j) entry of the matrix shows the average rate of economic growth 
for the country in the i-th quartile of domestic policy environment (DPE) and the j-th quartile of outward policy 
environment (OPE). Note that DPE and OPE are regression-based weighted indices obtained using the regression 
[5] in Table 1:  DPE = -2.653*Inflation - 1.07*Government burden, while OPE = +0.158* Trade openness 
+ 0.207*Financial openness.
2/ We report the standard deviation of growth in real GDP per capita (in logs) for countries in selected quartiles 
in a similar fashion as described in 1/. 
3/ The (i, j) entry of the matrix reports the number of country observations with economic growth in the i-th 
quartile and policy environment index in the j-th environment. Note that the index of policy environment (PE) is 
equal to the sum of DPE and OPE. Table 4 
Complementarities between structural reforms and the policy environment 
Dependent Variable: Growth in real GDP per capita 
Estimation method: System GMM-IV including time dummies 
Variables  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
I. Structural Factors and Policy Environment 
Human Capital  0.786 **  9.416 **  0.664 **  1.180 **  4.840 **  3.416 **
 (Secondary gross enrollment rate, logs)  (0.17)  (1.20)  (0.15)  (0.13)  (1.17)  (1.40) 
Financial Depth  0.358 **  0.202 **  2.767 **  0.363 **  -0.951 **  -1.357 **
 (Private Credit as % of GDP, logs)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.50)  (0.10)  (0.47)  (0.51) 
Institutions  3.885 **  3.461 **  4.163 **  14.832 **  12.740 **  11.306 **
 (ICRG Political risk index, logs)  (0.32)  (0.36)  (0.34)  (1.40)  (2.80)  (3.30) 
Policy environment index (PE)  1/  44.902 **  46.335 **  19.353 **  72.121 **  72.293 **  69.844 ** 
(Regression-based weighted average )  (4.52)  (5.10)  (2.01)  (6.62)  (9.48)  (11.30) 
II. Interaction between structural factors and policy environment 
PE * Output per capita  -4.777 **  ..  ..  ..  ..  -1.589 * 
(0.57)  (0.84) 
PE * Human capital  ..  -10.228 **  ..  ..  -4.978 **  -3.326 ** 
(1.40)  (1.36)  (1.61) 
PE * Financial depth  ..  ..  -3.338 **  ..  1.300 **  1.770 ** 
(0.60)  (0.58)  (0.63) 
PE * Institutions  ..  ..  ..  -16.377 **  -13.237 **  -11.494 ** 
(1.75)  (3.24)  (3.93) 
III. Transitional Convergence 
Initial GDP per capita  3.459 **  -0.277 **  -0.207 *  -0.337 **  -0.175 **  1.180 *
 (in logs)  (0.51)  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.08)  (0.73) 
Countries  101  101  101  101  101  101 
Observations  608  608  608  608  608  608 
Specification Tests (p-value)
 - Sargan  (0.27)  (0.17)  (0.31)  (0.18)  (0.20)  (0.19)
 - 2nd. Order Correlation  (0.84)  (0.86)  (0.98)  (0.81)  (0.84)  (0.82) 
Our regressions include a constant and time dummies (not reported but available from the authors). The figures in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates represent robust 
standard errors corrected for small sample bias (Windmeijer, 2005).  * (**) implies that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10 (5) % level. 
1/ The policy environment index (PE) is the regression weighted average of the policy variables such as the inflation rate, the government burden, trade openness and financial 
openness. We use the coefficient estimates of regression [5] in Table 1 as weights such that: PE = -2.653*Inflation-1.07*Government burden+0.158*Trade openness + 
0.207*Financial openness. Note that these indices have been normalized such that they take values between 0 and 1, and higher values of these indices signals a better 
policy environment (as represented by high macroeconomic stability and higher openness). Table 5 
Complementarities among structural reforms, domestic and outward policy environment 
Dependent Variable: Growth in real GDP per capita 
Estimation method: System GMM-IV including time dummies 
Variables  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
I. Structural Factors and Policy Environment 
Human Capital  0.377 *  9.241 **  0.388 *  0.418 *  13.562 **  8.816 **
 (Secondary gross enrollment rate, logs)  (0.23)  (1.79)  (0.23)  (0.22)  (1.90)  (2.17) 
Financial Depth  0.352 **  0.453 **  5.019 **  0.449 **  1.449 **  -0.437
 (Private Credit as % of GDP, logs)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.81)  (0.12)  (0.65)  (0.92) 
Institutions  3.340 **  3.314 **  3.493 **  20.614 **  -9.184 **  -8.827 **
 (ICRG Political risk index, logs)  (0.42)  (0.42)  (0.43)  (3.33)  (3.76)  (3.82) 
Domestic policy environment index (DPE) 1/  39.053 **  38.585 **  23.342 **  79.934 **  98.069 **  113.061 ** 
(Regression-based weighted average )  (6.90)  (6.55)  (3.00)  (16.90)  (15.61)  (19.24) 
Outward policy environment index (OPE) 2/  15.064 **  25.057 **  11.416 **  31.739 **  -124.615 **  -132.262 ** 
(Regression-based weighted average )  (3.40)  (4.61)  (2.15)  (11.33)  (9.28)  (11.47) 
II. Interaction between structural factors and policy environment 
DPE * Output per capita  -4.218 **  ..  ..  ..  ..  -4.588 ** 
(0.96)  (1.70) 
OPE * Output per capita  -1.290 **  ..  ..  ..  ..  -0.619 
(0.51)  (0.91) 
DPE * Human capital  ..  -8.187 **  ..  ..  -11.415 **  -5.534 ** 
(1.91)  (2.18)  (2.29) 
OPE * Human capital  ..  -5.304 **  ..  ..  -8.209 **  -7.617 ** 
(1.25)  (1.61)  (1.72) 
DPE * Financial Depth  ..  ..  -4.910 **  ..  2.539 **  4.875 ** 
(0.95)  (0.74)  (1.24) 
OPE * Financial Depth  ..  ..  -1.863 **  ..  -5.415 **  -5.085 ** 
(0.77)  (0.72)  (0.74) 
DPE * Institutions  ..  ..  ..  -18.605 **  -14.512 **  -16.845 ** 
(4.53)  (4.98)  (5.95) 
OPE * Institutions  ..  ..  ..  -6.567 **  43.428 **  45.762 ** 
(2.97)  (3.08)  (4.19) 
III. Transitional Convergence 
Initial GDP per capita  3.721 **  -0.130  -0.144  -0.202  -0.498 **  3.231 **
 (in logs)  (0.73)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.17)  (0.13)  (1.27) 
Countries  101  101  101  101  101  101 
Observations  608  608  608  608  608  608 
Specification Tests (p-value)
 - Sargan  (0.26)  (0.32)  (0.18)  (0.20)  (0.29)  (0.36)
 - 2nd. Order Correlation  (0.94)  (0.91)  (0.86)  (0.87)  (0.71)  (0.60) 
Our regressions include a constant and time dummies (not reported but available from the authors). The figures in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates represent robust
standard errors corrected for small sample bias (Windmeijer, 2005).  * (**) implies that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10 (5) % level.
1/ The domestic policy environment (DPE) is equal to -2.653*Inflation-1.07*Government burden (using the coefficient of regression 5 of Table 1).
2/ The outward policy environment (OPE) equals 0.158*Trade openness + 0.207*Financial openness, with the weights are coefficient estimates taken from regression 5 of Table 1. 
Note that these indices have been normalized such that they take values between 0 and 1, and higher values of these indices signals better policy environment (as represented by high
macroeconomic stability and higher openness).Table 6 
Growth effects of structural factors: The role of the policy environment 
Growth response to a one-standard deviation increase in structural factors conditional on the policy environment 


























































































1/ Using the regression estimates of column [6] in Table 4, we compute the growth response to a one standard deviation increase in 
output per capita, human capital, financial depth, and institutional quality conditional on selected percentiles of the sample distribution of 
the policy environment index (PE). We compute the growth response for the median of the PE index ("median effect") as well as for the 
10th percentile (countries with bad policies) and 90th percentile (countries with good policies). Note that the line "Difference" reports 
the difference bewteen the growth response at the 90th percentile of PE minus the response for countries at the 10th percentile sample 
distribution of PE. The number in parenthesis represents the Chi-square statistic that tests the equality of these two responses. 
2/ We use the regression estimates of column [6] in Table 5 to compute the growth response to a one standard deviation increase in 
output per capita, human capital, financial depth, and institutional quality conditional on selected percentiles of the sample distribution of 
the domestic and outward policy environment indices (DPE and OPE, respectively). The growth response for the median of the DPE index 
(as well as for the OPE index) is reported in the line "Median", while the response for countries with good and bad policies are reported in 
the lines of 10th and 90th percentile of DPE (and OPE). Table 7 
Can "good policies" mitigate the adverse growth effects of aggregate volatility? 
Dependent Variable: Growth in real GDP per capita 
Estimation method: System GMM-IV including time dummies 
Internal  External 
Instruments  Instruments 
Variables  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
I. Structural Factors and Policy Environment 
Human Capital  1.323 **  1.072 **  1.005 **  0.638 **
 (Secondary gross enrollment rate, logs)  (0.27)  (0.22)  (0.14)  (0.11) 
Financial Depth  0.276 **  0.124  0.530 **  0.751 **
 (Private Credit as % of GDP, logs)  (0.12)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.08) 
Institutions  1.873 **  2.995 **  2.332 **  2.858 **
 (ICRG Political risk index, logs)  (0.26)  (0.30)  (0.15)  (0.22) 
Policy environment index (PE)  1/  0.963  ..  2.915 **  .. 
(Regression-based weighted average )  (2.26)  (1.43) 
Domestic policy environment index (DPE)  2/  ..  -6.928 **  ..  -4.518 ** 
(Regression-based weighted average )  (1.94)  (1.92) 
Outward policy environment index (OPE)  2/  ..  12.896 **  ..  14.762 ** 
(Regression-based weighted average )  (1.41)  (1.21) 
II. Growth volatility and its Interaction with the policy environment 
Growth volatility  -6.003 **  -4.849 **  -3.180 **  -2.223 ** 
(Std. Dev. Growth in real GDP per capita )  (1.26)  (1.01)  (0.69)  (1.02) 
PE * Growth volatility  4.969 **  ..  1.568 *  .. 
(1.45)  (0.81) 
DPE * Growth volatility  ..  9.404 **  ..  6.536 ** 
(1.29)  (0.96) 
OPE * Growth volatility  ..  -7.200 **  ..  -6.496 ** 
(1.23)  (0.90) 
III. Transitional Convergence 
Initial GDP per capita  -0.395 **  -0.556 **  -0.648 **  -0.616 **
 (in logs)  (0.15)  (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.09) 
Countries  101  101  100  100 
Observations  608  608  590  590 
Specification Tests (p-value)
 - Sargan  (0.27)  (0.28)  (0.33)  (0.48)
 - 2nd. Order Correlation  (0.25)  (0.23)  (0.45)  (0.54) 
Our regressions include a constant and time dummies (not reported but available from the authors). The figures in parenthesis below the coefficient 
estimates represent robust standard errors corrected for small sample bias (Windmeijer, 2005).  * (**) implies that the coefficient estimate is significant 
at the 10 (5) % level. We instrument for the volatility of growth in real GDP per capita using: (a) internal instruments (lagged levels and differences of 
the standard deviation of growth in output per capita), and (b) external instruments (the standard deviation of terms of trade shocks, external demand 
growth and the standard deviation of world real interest rates).  1/ See note 1 in Table 4.  2/ See notes 1 and 2 in Table 5. Table 8 
Policy volatility, external volatility and the policy environment 
Dependent Variable: Growth in real GDP per capita 
Estimation method: System GMM-IV including time dummies 
Variables  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
I. Structural Factors and Policy Environment 
Human Capital  0.805 **  1.336 **  0.871 **  0.911 **  1.124 **  1.271 **
 (Secondary gross enrollment rate, logs)  (0.22)  (0.27)  (0.20)  (0.22)  (0.23)  (0.22) 
Financial Depth  0.162  0.744 **  0.595 **  0.548 **  0.288 **  0.827 **
 (Private Credit as % of GDP, logs)  (0.15)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.17)  (0.12)  (0.17) 
Institutions  3.808 **  3.521 **  3.376 **  3.986 **  5.857 **  3.269 **
 (ICRG Political risk index, logs)  (0.35)  (0.37)  (0.30)  (0.32)  (0.32)  (0.38) 
Policy environment index (PE)  1/  5.743 **  8.596 **  2.713  6.104 **  7.617 **  0.111 
(Regression-based weighted average )  (1.64)  (1.21)  (2.55)  (1.29)  (1.26)  (3.71) 
II. Volatility and its Interaction with the policy environment 
Policy volatility  2/  -9.939 **  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
(4.02) 
External volatility  3/  ..  -2.400 *  ..  ..  ..  .. 
(1.54) 
Terms of trade volatility  ..  ..  -2.157 **  ..  ..  -2.911 ** 
(0.78)  (1.13) 
External demand volatility  ..  ..  ..  -2.553 **  ..  -3.837 ** 
(1.23)  (1.83) 
Volatility of world real interest rates  ..  ..  ..  ..  -2.445 **  1.878 
(1.00)  (2.06) 
PE * Policy volatility  12.029 **  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
(5.09) 
PE * External volatility  ..  1.672  ..  ..  ..  .. 
(1.87) 
PE * Terms of trade volatility  ..  ..  2.142 **  ..  ..  3.147 ** 
(0.90)  (1.30) 
PE * External demand volatility  ..  ..  ..  2.443 *  ..  3.621 * 
(1.48)  (2.10) 
PE * Volatility of world real interest rates  ..  ..  ..  ..  2.661 **  -2.145 
(1.20)  (2.56) 
III. Transitional Convergence 
Initial GDP per capita  -0.245 *  -0.840 **  -0.488 **  -0.393 **  -0.653 **  -0.920 **
 (in logs)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.15) 
Countries  98  100  100  101  101  100 
Observations  593  590  590  608  608  590 
Specification Tests (p-value)
 - Sargan  (0.20)  (0.25)  (0.15)  (0.18)  (0.23)  (0.18)
 - 2nd. Order Correlation  (0.72)  (0.78)  (0.99)  (0.93)  (0.62)  (0.87) 
Our regressions include a constant and time dummies (not reported but available from the authors). The figures in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates represent robust standard 
errors corrected for small sample bias (Windmeijer, 2005).  * (**) implies that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10 (5) % level. 
1/ The policy environment index (PE) is the regression weighted average of the policy variables such as the inflation rate, the government burden, trade openness and financial openness. 
We use the coefficient estimates of regression [5] in Table 1 as weights such that: PE = -2.653*Inflation-1.07*Government burden+0.158*Trade openness +0.207*Financial 
openness. Note that this index has been normalized such that they take values between 0 and 1, with higher values of PE indicating better policy environments. 
2/ Policy volatility is calculated using the methodology of Fatas and Mihov (2003, 2006). We regress real government spending (in logs) on output growth, lagged government 
spending and a time trend, and we instrument output growth with lagged output growth, past inflation (linear and squared), and current and lagged values of oil prices. 
3/ External volatility is computed as the aggregate index of the terms of trade volatility, external demand volatility and the volatility of world real interest rates. The weights of the index 
are calculated by regression growth on initial GDP per capita, structural and policy variables, and the volatility of external shocks. The regression results (not reported here but available 
from the authors) yield: External volatility = 0.2037*ToT Volatility +0.6786*External demand volatility +0.7465*Volatility of world real interest rates. We took the absolute 
value of these coefficients (all have a negative contribution on growth) to construct the index so that higher values of the aggregate index would indicate higher external volatility. Table 9 
Policy volatility, external volatility, domestic and outward policy environment 
Dependent Variable: Growth in real GDP per capita 
Estimation method: System GMM-IV including time dummies 
Variables  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
I. Structural Factors and Policy Environment 
Human Capital  0.241 **  0.714 **  0.757 **  1.131 **  0.854 **  0.988 **
 (Secondary gross enrollment rate, logs)  (0.12)  (0.28)  (0.16)  (0.13)  (0.27)  (0.29) 
Financial Depth  0.268 **  0.738 **  0.615 **  0.513 **  0.422 **  0.538 **
 (Private Credit as % of GDP, logs)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.16)  (0.15) 
Institutions  3.931 **  3.394 **  2.861 **  4.360 **  4.324 **  3.109 **
 (ICRG Political risk index, logs)  (0.20)  (0.38)  (0.21)  (0.28)  (0.47)  (0.42) 
Domestic policy environment index (DPE) 1/  3.280 **  10.408 **  5.077 **  3.446 **  6.138 **  4.704 
(Regression-based weighted average )  (1.12)  (0.98)  (2.45)  (1.10)  (1.34)  (4.74) 
Outward policy environment index (OPE) 1/  7.022 **  2.290 **  1.959 *  8.199 **  3.525 **  1.530 
(Regression-based weighted average )  (0.71)  (1.02)  (1.29)  (1.14)  (1.59)  (2.50) 
II. Volatility and its Interaction with the policy environment 
Policy volatility  2/  -20.878 **  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
(4.67) 
External volatility  3/  ..  0.215  ..  ..  ..  .. 
(1.37) 
Terms of trade volatility  ..  ..  -2.330 **  ..  ..  -2.671 ** 
(0.55)  (1.25) 
External demand volatility  ..  ..  ..  -0.265 **  ..  -0.070 
(0.10)  (0.13) 
Volatility of world real interest rates  ..  ..  ..  ..  -0.984  -0.884 ** 
(0.28)  (0.23) 
Domestic policy environment (DPE)  15.341 **  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
x Policy volatility  (4.32) 
Outward policy environment (OPE)  1.261  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
x Policy volatility  (9.17) 
DPE * External volatility  ..  -4.605 **  ..  ..  ..  .. 
(1.65) 
OPE * External volatility  ..  3.845 **  ..  ..  ..  .. 
(1.53) 
DPE * Terms of trade volatility  ..  ..  1.410 *  ..  ..  -3.379 ** 
(0.82)  (1.64) 
OPE * Terms of trade volatility  ..  ..  1.552 **  ..  ..  8.844 ** 
(0.38)  (0.95) 
DPE * External demand volatility  ..  ..  ..  1.985 **  ..  7.717 ** 
(0.54)  (1.42) 
OPE * External demand volatility  ..  ..  ..  -4.761 **  ..  -12.383 ** 
(0.67)  (1.90) 
DPE * Volatility of world real interest rates  ..  ..  ..  ..  -2.991 **  -2.804 ** 
(1.14)  (0.89) 
OPE * Volatility of world real interest rates  ..  ..  ..  ..  3.339 **  3.518 ** 
(1.32)  (1.01) 
III. Transitional Convergence 
Initial GDP per capita  -0.340 **  -0.615 **  -0.366 **  -0.851 **  -0.372 **  -0.747 **
 (in logs)  (0.08)  (0.15)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.17)  (0.17) 
Countries  98  100  100  101  101  100 
Observations  593  590  590  608  608  590 
Specification Tests (p-value)
 - Sargan  (0.45)  (0.58)  (0.26)  (0.23)  (0.32)  (0.85)
 - 2nd. Order Correlation  (0.52)  (0.65)  (0.91)  (0.44)  (0.67)  (0.75) 
Our regressions include a constant and time dummies (not reported but available from the authors). The figures in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates represent robust standard
errors corrected for small sample bias (Windmeijer, 2005).  * (**) implies that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10 (5) % level.
1/  See footnote 1 in Table 4.  2/ 3/ See footnotes 2 and 3 in Table 8.Table 10 
Growth effects of rising volatility: The role of the policy environment 
Growth response to doubling aggregate, policy and/or external volatility conditional on the policy environment 
Growth  Policy  External Volatility 

















90th percentile  -1.211  0.727  -0.605  -0.025  -0.367  -0.056 
Difference  0.164  1.262  0.175  0.330  0.380  -0.225
 (p-value )  (0.076)  (0.250)  (0.300)  (0.003)  (0.050)  (0.667) 
















90th percentile  -0.415  -5.391  -0.929  -0.294  -0.558  -0.810 
Difference  0.503  1.181  -0.355  -0.260  0.594  -0.216
 (p-value )  (0.000)  (0.102)  (0.013)  (0.022)  (0.002)  (0.411) 
















90th percentile  -1.136  -5.899  -0.474  0.472  -1.748  -0.449 
Difference  -1.024  0.199  0.606  1.395  -1.953  0.555
 (p-value )  (0.000)  (0.874)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.049) 
1/ The response of economic growth to doubling aggregate volatility conditional on the policy environment is calculated using: (a) the estimate of regression [3] in Table 7 for growth volatility, 
(b) the estimate of regression [1] in Table 8 for policy volatility, (c) the estimates of regression [2] in Table 8 for the overall index of external volatility, (d) the estimates of regression [6] in 
Table 8 for terms of trade volatility, external demand volatility, and the volatility of world real interest rates. 
2/ The response of economic growth to doubling aggregate volatility conditional on the domestic and outward policy environment is calculated using: (a) the estimate of regression [4] in Table 7 
for growth volatility, (b) the estimates of regression [1] in Table 9 for policy volatility, (c) the estimates of regression [2] in Table 9 for the overall index of external volatility, (d) the estimates 
of regression [6] in Table 8 for terms of trade volatility, external demand volatility, and the volatility of world real interest rates. 
The row "Median" denotes the growth response to doubling (aggregate, policy, and external) volatility conditional on the policy environment of the representative country-period in the sample. 
On the other hand, the row "10th (90th) percentile" shows the growth response to rising volatility in countries with bad (good) policies. Finally, the row "Difference" reports the difference in 
the growth response to rising volatility between countries with good policies and countries with bad policies. Table A.1 
Sample of Countries 
Latin America and the Caribbean (22) 
ARG  Argentina  DOM  Dominican Republic  PAN  Panama 
BHS  Bahamas, The  ECU  Ecuador  PER  Peru 
BOL  Bolivia  GTM  Guatemala  PRY  Paraguay 
BRA  Brazil  HND  Honduras  SLV  El Salvador 
CHL  Chile  HTI  Haiti  TTO  Trinidad and Tobago 
COL  Colombia  JAM  Jamaica  URY  Uruguay 
CRI  Costa Rica  MEX  Mexico  VEN  Venezuela, RB 
NIC  Nicaragua 
East Asia and the Pacific (12) 
CHN  China  MNG  Mongolia  SGP  Singapore 
HKG  Hong Kong  MYS  Malaysia  THA  Thailand 
IDN  Indonesia  PHL  Philippines, The  TWN  Taiwan 
KOR  Korea, Rep.  PNG  Papua New Guinea  VNM  Vietnam 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (17) 
BGR  Bulgaria  KAZ  Kazakhstan  RUS  Russian Federation 
BLR  Belarus  KGZ  Kyrgyz Rep.  SVK  Slovak Rep. 
CZE  Czech Republic  LTU  Lithuania  SVN  Slovenia 
EST  Estonia  LVA  Latvia  UKR  Ukraine 
HRV  Croatia  POL  Poland  YSR  Serbia 
HUN  Hungary  ROM  Romania 
Industrial Economies (23) 
AUS  Australia  FIN  Finland  LUX  Luxembourg 
AUT  Austria  FRA  France  NLD  Netherlands 
BEL  Belgium  GBR  United Kingdom  NOR  Norway 
CAN  Canada  GRC  Greece  NZL  New Zealand 
CHE  Switzerland  IRL  Ireland  PRT  Portugal 
DEU  Germany  ISL  Iceland  SWE  Sweden 
DNK  Denmark  ITA  Italy  USA  United States 
ESP  Spain  JPN  Japan 
Middle East and North Africa (21) 
ARE  Algeria  ISR  Israel  OMN  Oman 
BHR  Bahrain  JOR  Jordan  QAT  Qatar 
CYP  Cyprus  KWT  Kuwait  SAU  Saudi Arabia 
DZA  Algeria  LBN  Lebanon  SYR  Syria 
EGY  Egypt, Arab Rep.  LBY  Lybia  TUN  Tunisia 
IRN  Iran, Islamic Rep.  MAR  Morocco  TUR  Turkey 
IRQ  Iraq  MLT  Malta  YEM  Yemen 
South Asia (5) 
BGD  Bangladesh  LKA  Sri Lanka  PAK  Pakistan 
IND  India  NPL  Nepal 
Sub-Saharan Africa (36) 
AGO  Angola  GIN  Guinea  RWA  Rwanda 
BDI  Burundi  GMB  Gambia, The  SDN  Sudan 
BEN  Benin  GNB  Guinea Bissau  SEN  Senegal 
BFA  Burkina Faso  KEN  Kenya  SLE  Sierra Leone 
BWA  Botswana  LSO  Lesotho  TCD  Chad 
CAF  Central African Republic  MDG  Madagascar  TGO  Togo 
CIV  Cote d'Ivoire  MLI  Mali  TZA  Tanzania 
CMR  Cameroon  MRT  Mauritania  UGA  Uganda 
COG  Congo, Rep.  MUS  Mauritius  ZAF  South Africa 
ETH  Ethiopia  MWI  Malawi  ZAR  Congo, Dem. Rep. 
GAB  Gabon  NER  Niger  ZMB  Zambia 
GHA  Ghana  NGA  Nigeria  ZWE  Zimbabwe Table A.2 
Sample Statistics 
Sample of 76 countries, 1960-2000 (5-year non-overlapping observations) 
Correlation 
Variable  Average  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum  with Growth 
Growth in GDP per capita  1.62  2.76  -11.03  13.66  .. 
Transitional Convergence 
Initial GDP per capita (in logs )  7.71  1.55  4.71  10.53  0.12 
Structural Factors 
Human capital (secondary enrollment, in logs )  3.75  0.78  1.30  4.99  0.22 
Private Credit (% of GDP, in logs )  3.42  0.90  -0.02  5.46  0.22 
Institutions (ICRG index, in logs )  4.10  0.29  3.13  4.57  0.37 
Policy Variables 
Inflation Rate (CPI, in log differences )  4.76  0.31  4.57  8.05  -0.29 
Government Burden (% GDP, in logs )  2.66  0.42  1.24  3.82  0.01 
Trade openness (Exports and imports, % GDP, in logs )  3.97  0.61  1.97  5.75  0.13 
Foreign liabilities (% GDP, in logs )  4.23  0.73  1.69  6.75  -0.12 
Foreign assets and liabilities (% GDP, in logs )  4.63  0.74  2.69  7.43  -0.04 
Equity-related foreign liabilities (% GDP, in logs )  2.47  1.39  -4.88  6.09  0.14 
Loan-related foreign liabilities (% GDP, in logs )  3.91  0.76  1.44  6.42  -0.21 
Equity-related foreign assets and liabilities (% GDP, in logs )  2.71  1.46  -4.88  6.45  0.15 
Loan-related foreign assets and liabilities (% GDP, in logs )  4.37  0.72  2.38  7.07  -0.09 
Policy Environment Index 
Policy Environment, overall index (PE)  0.83  0.09  0.00  1.00  0.43 
Domestic Policy Environment index (DPE)  0.75  0.08  0.00  1.00  0.38 
Outward Policy Environment index (OPE)  0.55  0.11  0.00  1.00  0.23 
Volatility 
Growth volatility  0.96  0.81  -1.35  4.01  -0.39 
Fiscal policy volatility  0.08  0.08  0.00  0.46  -0.33 
External volatility  0.33  0.74  -3.41  2.15  -0.28 
Terms of trade volatility  1.68  1.71  -12.17  4.23  -0.19 
External demand volatility  0.09  0.52  -2.05  2.00  -0.14 
Volatility of world real interest rates  -0.07  0.63  -1.45  1.71  -0.13 Table A.3 
Volatility and Growth: Baseline Regressions 
Dependent Variable: Growth in real GDP per capita 
Estimation method: System GMM-IV including time dummies 
Variables  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7] 
I. Structural Factors and Policy Environment 
Human Capital  0.775 **  0.801 **  0.909 **  0.851 **  1.145 **  1.482 **  1.417 **
 (Secondary gross enrollment rate, logs)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.21)  (0.21)  (0.22)  (0.25)  (0.29) 
Financial Depth  0.486 **  0.203 **  0.514 **  0.555 **  0.334 **  0.463 **  0.540 **
 (Private Credit as % of GDP, logs)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.17)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.13) 
Institutions  2.359 **  3.278 **  3.667 **  3.892 **  5.378 **  2.963 **  3.488 **
 (ICRG Political risk index, logs)  (0.17)  (0.21)  (0.28)  (0.31)  (0.31)  (0.39)  (0.39) 
Policy environment index (PE)  1/  5.432 **  7.208 **  8.174 **  5.953 **  6.879 **  9.181 **  8.644 ** 
(Regression-based weighted average )  (0.58)  (0.76)  (0.80)  (1.28)  (1.43)  (1.02)  (1.07) 
II. Volatility and its Interaction with the policy environment 
Growth Volatility  -1.719 **  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
(0.07) 
Policy volatility  2/  ..  -3.005 **  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
(0.79) 
Terms of trade volatility  ..  ..  -0.303 **  ..  ..  -0.204 **  .. 
(0.05)  (0.04) 
External demand volatility  ..  ..  ..  -0.516 **  ..  -0.679 **  .. 
(0.10)  (0.10) 
Volatility of world real interest rates  ..  ..  ..  ..  -0.858 **  -0.747 **  .. 
(0.32)  (0.21) 
External volatility  3/  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  -1.258 ** 
(0.10) 
III. Transitional Convergence 
Initial GDP per capita  -0.396 **  -0.243 **  -0.482 **  -0.362 **  -0.608 **  -0.758 **  -0.627 **
 (in logs)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.11)  (0.14)  (0.15) 
Countries  100  98  100  101  101  100  100 
Observations  590  593  590  608  608  590  590 
Specification Tests (p-value)
 - Sargan  (0.32)  (0.35)  (0.19)  (0.17)  (0.35)  (0.14)  (0.23)
 - 2nd. Order Correlation  (0.52)  (0.59)  (0.93)  (0.91)  (0.56)  (0.79)  (0.82) 
Our regressions include a constant and time dummies (not reported but available from the authors). The figures in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates represent robust standard errors corrected for small 
sample bias (Windmeijer, 2005).  * (**) implies that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 10 (5) % level.
1/ 2/ 3/  See footnote in Table 8.Figure 1 








I  III  IV 

























I  III  IV 



































I  III  IV 















I  III  IV 









































I  III  IV 












I  III  IV 





























II  II 







































Complementarities between Trade and Financial Openness
2.1 Growth Effect of Trade Openness
2.2 Growth Effect of Financial Openness conditional on trade openness
Note: We compute the growth effect of doubling trade openness (financial openness) conditional on selected sample percentiles of financial openness (trade openness). The solid line represent the growth effect of higher openness while the dotted lines represent the 5% confidence interval.
Figures 2.1(i) and 2.2(i) are computed using the coefficient estimates and the robust variance-covariance matrix of regression [1] of Table 2. Regression [3] estimates were used to calculate the growth responses in Figures 2.1(ii) and 2.2(ii). Finally, Figure 2.3(i) and 2.3(ii) were computed using the coefficient estimates of regression [7] in Table 2.
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Structural Factors, Policy Environment and Growth
Growth effects of a one-standard deviation increase in the structural factors
conditional on the country's economic policy environment
Note: We compute the growth effect of a one-standard deviation increase in real output per capita, human capital, financial development and institutions conditional on selected world sample percentiles of the distribution of our policy
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Structural Factors, Domestic Policy Environment and Growth 
Growth effects of a one-standard deviation increase in the structural factors 
conditional on the country's domestic policy environment 









Selected percentiles of the domestic policy environment distribution 







Selected percentiles of the domestic policy environment distribution 






Selected percentiles of the domestic policy environment distribution 







Selected percentiles of the domestic policy environment distribution 












































































Note: We compute the growth effect of a one-standard deviation increase in real output per capita, human capital, financial development and institutions conditional on selected world sample percentiles of the distribution of the domestic 
policy environment index. The solid line represents the growth effect of higher values of the structural factors whereas the dotted lines represent the 5% confidence interval. The figures were calculated using the estimates of regression [6] in Table 6. Figure 5
Structural Factors, Outward Policy Environment and Growth
Growth effects of a one-standard deviation increase in the structural factors
conditional on the country's outward policy environment
Note: We compute the growth effect of a one-standard deviation increase in real output per capita, human capital, financial development and institutions conditional on selected world sample percentiles of the distribution of the domestic
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Upper boundFigure 6 
Growth effects of aggregate volatility conditional on 
economic policy environment 
Growth effects of doubling the volatility of growth in real GDP per capita 





















































































1 0  2 0  3 0  4 0  5 0  6 0  7 0  8 0  9 0  9 9 
1 0  2 0  3 0  4 0  5 0  6 0  7 0  8 0  9 0  9 9 
1 0  2 0  3 0  4 0  5 0  6 0  7 0  8 0  9 0  9 9 
Note: We compute the effects of doubling growth volatility conditional on selected sample percentiles of the distribution of the the overall 
policy environment index as well as the domestic and outward components of that index. The solid line represents the growth effect of 
higher volatility whereas the dotted lines represent the 5% confidence interval. The figure (i) is computed using regression [4] of Table 7, 
while the figures (ii) and (iii) are calculated using the estimates of regression [6] in Table 7. Figure 7
Growth effects of policy and external volatility conditional on policy environment
Growth effects of doubling policy volatility and the volatility of external shocks conditional on the country's policy environment
Note: We compute the effects of doubling policy volatility and external volatility conditional on selected sample percentiles of the distribution of the the overall policy environment index. The solid line represents the growth effect of higher
policy volatility and external volatility whereas the dotted lines represent the 5% confidence interval. The figure (i) is computed using regression [1] of Table 8 and Figure (ii) is calculated using the regression estimates of regression [6] in Table 8.
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Growth effects of policy and external volatility conditional on domestic and outward policy environment 
Growth effects of doubling policy volatility and the volatility of external shocks conditional on the country's policy environment 
8.1 Growth effects of rising fiscal policy volatility










Selected percentiles of the domestic policy environment distribution 










Selected percentiles of the outward policy environment distribution 






































8.2 Growth effects of rising external volatility









Selected percentiles of the domestic policy environment distribution 









Selected percentiles of the outward policy environment distribution 






































Note: We compute the effects of doubling policy volatility and external volatility conditional on selected sample percentiles of the distribution of the the domestic and outward policy environment index. The solid line represents the growth effect of 
higher policy volatility as well as rising external volatility whereas the dotted lines represent the 5% confidence interval. The figure 8.1 is computed using regression [1] of Table 10. On the other hand, Figure 8.2 is calculated using the 
coefficient estimates of regression [6] of Table 10. Figure 9
Growth effects of the volatility of external shocks conditional on domestic and outward policy environment
Growth effects of doubling the volatility of external shocks conditional on the country's policy environment
9.1 Conditional on the country's domestic policy environment
9.2 Conditional on the country's outward policy environment
Note: The solid line represents the growth effect of higher volatility of the different (real and financial) external shocks and the dotted lines represent the 5% confidence interval. All growth responses were calculated using the estimates of regression [5] of Table 10.
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Selected percentiles of the outward policy environment distribution
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